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ABSTRACT 
 
 
US DEMOCRACY PROMOTION AND ENERGY SECURITY AFTER 9/11 
 
 
Mukhtar, Ali Reza. 
M.A., Department of International Relations 
Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Paul Williams 
 
October, 2011 
 
The objective of this thesis is to find out whether the US is also genuinely 
committed to promote democracy in those countries on which the US has oil 
dependency or does the US energy security interest eclipse its foreign policy 
principle of democracy promotion abroad after 9/11. The hypothesis of this research 
is that the US is less interested in promoting democracy in those countries on which 
the US has higher oil-dependency.  Materialist theory of democracy promotion is 
used to drive this hypothesis. Two statistical methods are employed, i.e. (1) 
hypothesis testing by using t-test and (2) regression, to estimate the variation of the 
USAID democracy assistance in those countries on which the US has higher oil 
dependency compared with those countries on which the US has less or no oil 
dependency. The findings of this thesis show that the USAID spends, on average, 
less funding for democracy-related programmes in those countries on which the US 
has higher oil-dependency and vice versa. These results indicate that, although the 
US prioritized its democracy promotion after 9/11 in order to tackle the problem of
iv 
 
terrorism, the US energy security remains the prime concern for which the US 
compromises on its foreign policy principle of democracy promotion abroad.  
 
Keywords: Democracy, US Democracy Promotion, Democracy Assistance, 
Energy Security 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Promotion of democracy in the world has been one of the most important principles 
of US foreign policy throughout history. However, the importance of this principle 
for the US policymakers increased considerably after the tragic event of 9/11. This 
has been because the US started including democracy promotion in foreign countries 
among its national security objectives. A wider consensus developed among the 
experts that democracy could improve socioeconomic situations thus helping to 
tackle situations that breed political radicalism. In the National Security Strategy of 
2006, the most prominent element was elevating democracy promotion to "as the 
highest national security priority of the United States while all other foreign policy 
interests are now subordinate to its pursuit" (Korb and Wadhams, 2006: 2). 
Condoleezza Rice, the United States Secretary of State at that time, stated the 
following priorities of the US diplomacy:  
First, we will unite the community of democracies in building 
ainternational system that is based on shared values and the rule of 
law. Second, we will strengthen the community of democracies to 
fight the threats to our common security and alleviate the hopelessness 
that feeds terror. And third, we will spread freedom and democracy 
throughout the globe. That is the mission that President Bush has set 
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or America in the world and is the great mission of American 
diplomacy today (BBC, 2005).  
 
Since 9/11/2001, the US has employed various tools to foster democracy 
promotion, including both coercive and non-coercive methods. In analyzing 
National Security Strategy 2002, Monten (2005: 112) argued that, in the wake of US 
war against terrorism, the US "proposed a liberal international order grounded in US 
military and political power." Because of its military and economic primacy, the US 
positioned itself as "the sole pillar upholding a liberal world order that is conducive 
to the principles [the United States] believes in" (Monten, 2005: 112). The US 
invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq were meant, at least in rhetoric, to end tyranny in 
these countries and bring democracy in order to mitigate the suffering of the people. 
They were also of the view that the success of democracy in these countries would 
help to inspire other countries in the region, especially in the Middle East, to 
democratize their regimes.  
On the other hand, the event of 9/11 also created fears of the potential 
vulnerability of energy supplies as terrorist groups have considerable potential to 
damage the infrastructure of oil production and transportation. Since the US has 
been heavily involved in its war against terrorism by using its military power and, at 
the same time, dealing with a financial crisis as well as with rising oil prices, the 
security of its oil imports also became a prime concern of the US. In addition to 
this, the US is also concerned with the vulnerability of foreign oil infrastructure to 
terrorist attacks, since the US is importing a large portion of oil from the troubled 
region of Middle East. By analyzing data given by the National Memorial Institute 
for the Prevention of Terrorism, Moran (2010: 9) concludes that there have been a 
great numbers of terrorist attacks against energy supply infrastructure in the world 
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since 1990. Besides this, the policymakers are also concerned with the potential of 
terrorists to instigate civil unrest in oil-exporting developing countries, especially in 
the Middle Eastern region, which could also disrupt oil supply. Along with the 
terrorism problem, the active energy diplomacy of rising powers, like China and 
India, who are trying to secure larger portions of global oil production to satisfy 
their energy demands has also increased the worries of US foreign policymakers.  
 
1.1 Problem Statement and Research Question:  
Keeping in view the situation where the democracy is considered as an antidote to 
the problem of terrorism, while stability is considered important for security of oil 
supply, US foreign policy interests would seem to be in conflict with each other. 
Historically, US seems to have placed more importance on the stability of oil 
exporting countries than on promoting democracy when such conflicts of interest 
exist. For example, the US developed friendly relations with oil-exporting 
authoritarian regimes, like the Shah's Iran and Saudi Arabia, in order to ensure stable 
oil imports from these countries during the Cold War. Since 9/11, the foreign policy 
of the US has dramatically elevated the importance of promoting democracy in 
non-democratic countries as one of key foreign policy objectives. While there are 
scholars who claim that the US has deeply committed itself to promoting 
democracy either because of altruistic or because of pragmatic reasons, some 
scholars, on the other hand, have pointed out that the US takes democracy promotion 
as a strategic tool to foster its national interests, and it is seems to have been applied 
to selected countries where the US, by promoting democracy, can further its broader 
material interests. For example, Ipek (2007: 96) argues the US has pressured 
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Lebanon, Syria and Iran more than other non-democracies. On the other hand, 
countries like Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, which are crucial to US interests, "«VHHP WR 
have been granted exemptions" (Ipek, 2007: 96). Since the issues of both the democracy 
promotion in non-democratic countries and US energy security have become prime 
concerns for US policy makers, there is a need to know whether the US is genuinely 
committed to promoting democracy in oil-rich countries or whether US oil interests 
trump its policy of promoting democracy. In other words, there is need to 
understand the implication of US oil dependency on its promotion of democracy in 
oil-exporting countries. In this study, the research question is whether the US is truly 
interested in promoting democracy in those countries from where the US imports its 
oil.  
In order to answer these questions, there is a need to integrate the study of 
energy security and the US democracy promotion. Most of the available literatures 
focus on the post-9/11 US promotion of democracy and energy security separately. 
Some studies such as Forest and Sousa (2006), Carothers (2004) and Ipek (2007) 
have examined the interaction between oil imports and democracy promotion. 
However, they are limited to being single in-depth case studies, and so the existing 
literature lacks methodologically rigorous conclusions. Besides this, these studies have 
only focused on the tools of promoting democracy other than democracy assistance. 
According to Carothers (1999: 6), foreign assistance specifically for the purpose of 
democracy promotion is the most obvious and the most significant means for 
promoting democracy abroad. Hence, this limitation in the literature needs to be 
addressed in order to analyze the relationship between US policy of democracy 
promotion and its energy security. 
The aim of the study is to address these limitations and develop a 
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methodologically robust conclusion by using quantitative methods that test the 
relationship between the US oil dependency and the promotion of democracy in 
countries that have exported oil to the US after 9/11. For this, the materialist theory 
of democracy promotion proposed by Wolff and Wurm (2011: 86-87) shall be 
employed to test our hypothesis. By taking available statistics on US oil imports and 
USAID democracy assistance, two statistical methods, i.e. hypothesis testing by 
using the t-test method and multivariate regression, can be used to explore whether 
the US need for oil actually impedes US democracy promotion in oil-exporting 
countries.  
 
1.2 Significance of the study:  
This study is of significance to explaining US foreign policy, as this research tests, 
using quantitative analysis, the relative importance of democracy promotion vis-à-vis 
energy security for US foreign policy makers. The existing quantitative literature on 
US democracy promotion is very limited and those that are available focus on the 
impact of US democracy promotion on democratic change in foreign countries. For 
example, Finkel et al. (2007) undertake cross-national quantitative studies on the 
impact of US democracy assistance on democratic change abroad by taking a political 
approach to democracy promotion into consideration. Knack (2004) takes a 
developmental approach to democracy promotion and attempts a multivariate analysis 
of the impact of US foreign aid on democratic change in foreign countries. Scott and 
Steele (2005) study the impact of US democracy assistance, as channeled through the 
United States National Endowment for Democracy (NED), on democratic change in 
recipient countries during 1990-1999. Azpuru, Finkel, Liñán and Seligson (2008) 
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analysis the distribution of US democracy assistance and tried to identify patterns in 
the data from 1990 to 2005. On the other hand, no quantitative study has yet been 
done that deals with the impact of significant non-political factors on the US policy of 
democracy promotion.  
This research is an attempt to fill this gap and, by using quantitative analyses, 
contribute to the study of the impact of energy security on the US foreign policy of 
democracy promotion abroad.  
 
1.3 Structure of the Thesis: 
The thesis is divided into five chapters. The following chapter is the literature 
review, which sheds a light on the major literature contributions on US democracy 
promotion and identifies the gap which is addressed in this thesis. Besides this, key 
concepts of this thesis are also defined based on the literature, such as democracy, 
democracy promotion, and energy security. Furthermore, it also outlines various 
tools that the US uses to promote democracy in foreign countries. The third chapter 
is on theoretical framework where the theory used to derive our hypothesis is 
explained. Furthermore, this chapter also explains the theory in the context of our 
research question. Chapter four is on empirical analysis where it explains 
methodology, empirical findings and interpretations of findings. It also highlights the 
limitation of our analyses, its implications and my recommendations for future 
research on this topic. The final chapter is the conclusion, which summarizes the 
final results of the study. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND DEFINING KEY CONCEPTS 
 
 
2.1 Literature Review: 
The existing literature on the US democracy promotion can be broadly divided into 
three groups. The first group consists of those literatures that claim that the US is 
genuinely committed to promote democracy abroad either because of its moral 
values or because its pursuit of economic or security interests. On the other hand, the 
second group of literature claims that the US compromises on its commitment to 
promote democracy when the latter conflicts with vital US political, security and/or 
economic policy interests. These two groups of literature are based on mainstream IR 
theories, which usually take the procedural definition of democracy into 
consideration. A third group of literature uses a critical approach to argue that the 
United States, because of its interests actually in promoting capitalism and 
maintaining hegemony over third world countries, is promoting low-OHYHO ³HOLWH-
EDVHG´ GHPRFUDF\ LQ WKHVH FRXQWULHV VXFK WKDW RQO\ elite groups can contest 
elections.
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2.1.1 First Group of Literature: 
7KH OLWHUDWXUH LQ WKH ILUVW JURXS XVXDOO\ GHULYHV LWV PDLQ DUJXPHQWV IURP ³GHPRFUDWLF 
SHDFH WKHRU\´ ZKLFK FODLPV WKDW GHPRFUDFLHV GRQ¶W ZDJH ZDU DJDLQVW HDFK RWKHU 
Doyle (1997: 253-258), who is inspired from a German philosopher Immanuel  
.DQW¶V ZRUN Perpetual Peace, argues that there is an absence of wars among 
democracies. While explaining the reason for this absence of war, he argues that 
there are three factors that contribute to the peaceful relationship among 
democracies. First, it is hard to gain the required consent of citizens in democracies 
WR ZDJH ZDU EHFDXVH WKH FLWL]HQV KDYH WR IDFH WKH ³FRVW RI ZDU´ 'R\OH 1 -
258). Second, the citizens of democracies develop respect for other democracies 
based on their shared values and principles (Doyle, 1997: 253-258). Third, "liberal 
régimes" have market-based economies and thus, developed stronger trade links with 
each other. Hence, they GRQ¶W ZDQW WR MHRSDUGL]H WKHLU HFRQRPLF UHlationships by 
waging wars against each other (Doyle, 1997: 280-4). While analyzing the role of 
democratic peace theory in the US foreign policy principles, Talbott (1996: 47) 
claims that democracy promotion was given a priority over other foreign policy 
oEMHFWLYHV GXULQJ &OLQWRQ¶V DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ EDVHG RQ WKH UHDVRQ WKDW GHPRFUDWLF 
UHJLPHV DUH ³OHVV OLNHO\ WR WKUHDWHQ WKH SHDFH´ &DURWKHUV 00 1 1 GHVSLWH KLV 
negative views on US democracy promotion, also believes that Clinton 
DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ ZDV ³«LQWHUHVWHG LQ SURPRWLQJ GHPRFUDF\ DEURDG DV DQ HQG LQ LWVHOI´ 
because Clinton administration was a believer of democratic peace theory. Mazarr 
(2003: 510-11) notes that Bush and Reagan adhered to a similar foreign policy 
ideology that supports the notion of WKH ³GHPRFUDWLF SHDFH WKHRU\´  
Monten (2005: 114) has gone further in highlighting the active involvement 
of the US in spreading democracy and argues that George W. Bush was genuinely 
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committed to promote democracy because his policy of promoting democracy was 
³«URRWHG LQ DQ $PHULFDQ IRUHLJQ SROLF\ WUDGLWLRQ WKDW KDV DOZD\V HPEUDFHG 
OLEHUDOLVP DQG GHPRFUDF\´ +H PDLQWDLQV WKDW ³GHPRFUDF\ SURPRWLRQ LV QRW MXVW 
another foreign policy instrument or idealist diversion; it is central to US political 
ideQWLW\ DQG VHQVH RI QDWLRQDO SXUSRVH´ 0RQWHQ 00 11 /\QFK 00 1 
shares this opinion and argues furthermore that the Bush administration, especially in 
its first term, was heavily influenced by a neo-conservative world-view of a 
democratic world that the US has a moral duty to adherence and uphold.  
Based on this foreign policy tradition, Monten (2005: 113) argues that US 
foreign policy makers, while committed to their moral responsibilities of promoting 
democracy, are contending with two schools RI ³WKH ORQJ-term promotion of 
GHPRFUDWLF FKDQJH´  +H ODEHOV WKHVH WZR VFKRROV ³H[HPSODULVP´ DQG 
³YLQGLFDWLRQLVP´ WHUPV FRLQHG E\ %UDQGV 1 ³([HPSODULVP´ VXJJHVWV WKDW WKH 
US should exemplify its own democratic values in order to inspire other countries to 
XQGHUJR GHPRFUDWLF WUDQVIRUPDWLRQ ZKLOH ³YLQGLFDWLRQLVP´ PDLQWDLQV WKDW WKH 86 
VKRXOG WDNH ³«DFWLYH PHDVXUHV WR VSUHDG LWV XQLYHUVDO SROLWLFDO YDOXHV DQG 
LQVWLWXWLRQV´ 0RQWHQ 00 11 ,NHQEHUU\ 000 1-125) takes the same 
approach arguing that, while the US used a twin strategy of containing the Soviet 
8QLRQ¶V 0DU[LVW-Leninist ideology and promoting liberal democracy in the west, the 
policy of the US to promote democracy abroad persisted even after the cold war. 
However, he also points out WKDW E\ SURPRWLQJ ³OLEHUDO LQWHUQDWLRQDOLVP´ WKH 86 LV 
WDNLQJ D SUDJPDWLF DSSURDFK DV LW ³«LV EHWWHU DEOH WR SXUVXH LWV LQWHUHVWV UHGXFH 
security threats in its environment, and foster a stable political order when other 
states ± particularly the major great powers ± are democracies rather than non-
GHPRFUDFLHV´ ,NHQEHUU\ 000 10-4).  
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Smith (1994: 4) has the same opinion stating that the promotion of 
democracy, ³DV D ZD\ RI HQKDQFLQJ WKH QDWLRQDO VHFXULW\´ LV FHQWUDO WR US foreign 
policy objectives. He further maintains that the role of the US in promoting 
GHPRFUDF\ LV LQGLVSHQVDEOH DQG ³«ZH FDQ KDYH QR FRQILGHQFH WKDW ZLWKRXW WKH 
8QLWHG 6WDWHV GHPRFUDF\ ZRXOG KDYH VXUYLYHG´ 6PLWK 1 -10).  It can be 
inferred from Richards (2003: 70) that, while the neo-conservative world-view may 
seem ideal in nature, the foreign policy of the US for promoting democracy is 
³«DQRWKHU YDULDQW RI realpolitik.´ 1HR-conservatives hold the view that the world 
³«PXVW EH UHVKDSHG LQ WKH 86 LPDJH´ VR WKDW WKH ELJJHVW security problem that 
confronts by the United States, especially in the troubled region of the Middle East, 
can be solved (Dalacoura 2005: 974-  'DODFRXUD 00  DUJXHV WKDW %XVK¶V 
first administration forged a consensus among foreign policy makerV ³«WKDW 
fostering democracy in the Middle East would drain the pool from which terrorist 
RUJDQL]DWLRQV GUDZ UHFUXLWV LQ WKHLU µJOREDO VWUXJJOH¶ DJDLQVW WKH 86´  
Diamond (1995: 31) and Whitehead (1996: 60), while advancing a minimalist 
definition of democUDF\ DUJXH WKDW WKH 86 FRQWULEXWHG DQG EURXJKW DERXW ³«D 
GLIIHUHQFH LQ WKH HDUO\ 10V´ E\ DVVLVWLQJ &RORPELD DQG 9HQH]XHOD ZKHQ GHPRFUDF\ 
was flourishing there. Carothers (2004: 35), in explaining the US foreign policy of 
promoting democracy abroad, has criticized the narrow definition of democracy 
EHLQJ SURPRWHG DQG 86 QHJOHFWHG VXEVWDQWLYH GHPRFUDWLF YDOXHV DQG ³DFWXDO SROLWLFDO 
SDUWLFLSDWLRQ´ ,Q DQDO\]LQJ 86 GHPRFUDF\ SURPRWLRQ LQ /DWLQ $PHULFD Carothers 
(00  FODLPV WKDW LQ WKHVH ³VR-called new GHPRFUDFLHV´ WKHUH ZHUH 
³DQWLGHPRFUDWLF SRZHU VWUXFWXUHV´ LQ ZKLFK RQO\ VPDOO JURXSV RI HOLWHV WRRN SDUW +H 
VWUHVVHV WKDW WKH 86 VKRXOG IRFXV RQ ³«KHOSLQJ FRXQWULHV WXUQ GHPRFUDWLF IRUP LQWR 
GHPRFUDWLF VXEVWDQFH´ (Carothers, 2004: 35). However, he also maintains that 
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bringing genuine democracy to foreign countries is a very arduous task (Carothers, 
2004: 35). By citing the examples of Yugoslavia, Ukraine and Georgia from 2000 to 
2005 as success stories, Carothers (2004: 35) and Fukuyama (2007: 131) assert that 
US involvement in promoting democracy can be useful only if there are strong 
domestic actors the in targeted countries who have an interest in democracy and its 
promotion.   
 
2.1.2 Second Group of Literature: 
The second group of the literatures belongs to those scholars who hold the view that 
the US undermines its values or moral interest in promoting democracy when these 
clash with other vital economic or security interests. Hook (2002: 122-123) claims 
that, even though the promotion of democracy can help the US to fulfill its material 
self-LQWHUHVWV WKH 86 KDV FRPSURPLVHG RQ LWV ³GHFODUHG SULQFLSOHV´ ZKHUH RWKHU YLWDO 
economic and/or political interests lie in conflict with these principles. Peceny (1999: 
2) observes, more specifically, that the US ³KDV RIWHQ DOOLHG LWVHOI ZLWK EUXWDOO\ 
UHSUHVVLYH UHJLPHV UDWKHU WKDQ ZLWK OLEHUDO RSSRQHQWV RI VXFK UHJLPHV´ %\ FLWLQJ WKH 
example of the coups in Guatemala in 1954 and Chile in 1973, Peceny (1999: 2) 
further maintains that the US was deeply involved in covert measures to overthrow 
elected governments in these countries. Smith (1994: 29) also accepts, in regards to 
Latin America, that US foreign policy towards the region has helped sustain 
dictatorship rather than fostering democratic change. In another example, Clinton 
maintained cordial relationship with the authoritarian regimes in Egypt and Saudi 
Arabia that served the US interest in energy security among other things (Carothers, 
2004: 42). 
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In another set of analyses of the US relationship with the Middle Eastern 
countries, Ottaway and et al. (2002: 236) point out that Bush administration, which 
showed a strong commitment to build democracies in the region immediately after 
9/11, later compromised on the importance of this objective in the Middle East. The 
significant reason for this compromise, according to Ottaway and et al. (2002: 236), 
LV WKDW WKH 86 GLG QRW ZDQW WR MHRSDUGL]H RWKHU YLWDO LQWHUHVWV E\ ³«DQWDJRQL]H>LQJ@ 
the very regimes whoVH FRRSHUDWLRQ LW VHHNV´ LQ RWKHU YLWDO DUHDV VXFK DV WKH ZDU 
against terrorism, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and security of oil supplies. 
Carothers (2004: 256) also maintains that the Bush administration was always 
FRQFHUQHG ³«DERXW QRW SURGXFLQJ FDWDFO\VPLF FKDQJH´ ZKLOH SURPRWLQJ GHPRFUDF\ 
in the Middle East. :KLOH DUJXLQJ WKDW LW LV EHWWHU XQGHUVWRRG DV ³VHPLUHDOLVW´ 
approach, Carothers (2004: 4) also notes that the Bush administration used strong 
rhetoric on promoting democracy even though it could not live up to its rhetoric 
when democratization was in conflict with other vital interests and it allied with 
authoritarian regimes that served strong US economic and/or political interests. 
Carothers (2004: 65), who also examines US relations with authoritarian countries in 
Central Asia, states that the US has always been caught on the horns of a dilemma 
between choosing democracy or other competing security or economic interests in 
WKLV UHJLRQ +H PDLQWDLQV WKDW ZKLOH WKH 86 XVHG ³VWURQJ ZRUGHG PHVVDJHV´ WR 8]EHN 
officials on the need to liberalize politics and the economy, the Bush administration 
ZDV UHOXFWDQW WR DSSO\ WKH VDPH SROLF\ WRZDUG .D]DNKVWDQ EHFDXVH RI WKH ODWWHU¶V RLO 
and gas reserves (Carothers, 2004: 65). Diamond (1992: 29-43), despite claims that 
the US is genuinely committed to promoting democracy, also concerns that the US 
DOOLHG ZLWK GLFWDWRUV DQG ³RUFKHVWUDWHG´ WKH RYHUWKURZ RI GHPRFUDWLF UHJLPHV LQ VRPH 
FRXQWULHV GXULQJ WKH &ROG :DU EHFDXVH RI ³«WKH &ROG :DU REVHVVLRQ ZLWK 
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communisP´ /RZHQWKDO 11 -279), in analyzing the US policy of promoting 
GHPRFUDF\ LQ /DWLQ $PHULFD DUJXHV WKDW ³WKH 86 JRYHUQPHQW KDV DFWLYHO\ SURPRWHG 
/DWLQ $PHULFDQ GHPRFUDF\ RQO\ RQ RFFDVLRQV´  
 
2.1.3 Third Group of Literature: 
Literatures that take critical approach to analyze US democracy promotion maintain 
WKDW WKH 86 LV QRW SURPRWLQJ JHQXLQH GHPRFUDF\ EXW ³HOLWH-GHPRFUDF\´ ³ORZ-
LQWHQVLW\ GHPRFUDF\´ RU ³SRO\DUFKLHV´ LQ WKLUG ZRUOG FRXQWULHV WKDW ZRXOG KHOS WKH 
US to maintain its leadership position in the capitalist world (Walker, 2008: 45). 
Robinson (1996: 49), Gills, Rocamora and Wilson (1993: 3) argue that the United 
States, before 1980s, backed friendly authoritarian regimes in order to foster 
capitalism in these countries.  However, the US started realizing in the 1980s that 
authoritarian regimes posed a danger to the US mission of promoting capitalism 
when the world witnessed the downfall of Somoza in Nicaragua and the Shah of Iran 
(Gills, Rocamora and Wilson, 1993: 3). In their view, authoritarian forms of 
government would invoke social rifts that would create conditions for revolution 
(Gills, Rocamora and Wilson, 1993: 3). Robinson (1996: 49) also maintained that the 
86 SURPRWHG ³SRO\DUFK\´ LQ RUGHU WR SUHHPSW PDVV UHYROXWLRQ DQG PLWLJDWH GRPHstic 
pressure for real democratic change. To this end, the US cut its support to 
DXWKRULWDULDQ UHJLPHV DQG SURPRWHG ³ORZ OHYHO GHPRFUDF\´ LQ 6RXWK .RUHD 
Philippines, Haiti, and Guatemala (Gills, Rocamora and Wilson: 1993: 21). 
However, militaries in these countries still remained powerful, independent, and 
complicit in rampant human right abuses and violations (Gills, Rocamora and 
:LOVRQ 1 1 :LWK ³ORZ OHYHO GHPRFUDF\´ WKH 86 ZDQWHG WKH 7KLUG :RUOG 
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country in question to remain a source of cheap labor and raw materials as well as a 
market for highly expensive goods and services from western countries (Gills. 
Rocamora and Wilson, 1993: 17). 
Chomsky (1992: 348) makes a similar argument that the US is against 
SURPRWLQJ GHPRFUDF\ ³«LQ ZKLFK FLWL]HQV PD\ play some meaningful part in the 
PDQDJHPHQW RI SXEOLF DIIDLUV´ +H DOVR SRLQWV RXW WKDW WKH 86 ZDV LQYROYHG LQ 
UHPRYLQJ ³SDUOLDPHQWDU\ UHJLPHV´ IURP SRZHU DQG HOLPLQDWLQJ ³«SRSXODU 
organizations that might offer the majority of the population an opportunity to enter 
WKH SROLWLFDO DUHQD´ &KRPVN\ 1 1 +RZHYHU KH DOVR PDLQWDLQV WKDW WKH 86 
WROHUDWHG H[LVWLQJ GHPRFUDWLF LQVWLWXWLRQV DV ORQJ DV WKH ³«HOHPHQWV RI WKH ROLJDUFK\ 
EXVLQHVV FRPPXQLW\ DQG PLOLWDU\ WKDW XQGHUVWDQG DQG VHUYH 86 SULRULWLHV´ UHPained 
powerful. While analyzing the current US foreign policy towards Iraq, he argues that 
the US has an interest in keeping Iraq under its control. Hence, the US is promoting 
³WKH FRQYHQWLRQDO µWRS-GRZQ¶ IRUP´ WKDW EULQJV DQG NHHSV 86 IULHQGO\ HOLWHV LQ 
power (Chomsky, 2006: 162). Likewise, Smith (2000: 67) also points out that the US 
has always supported dictators at the expense of democratic regimes, especially in 
Latin and Central America. However, he also maintains that in cases where the US 
does promote democracy in Third World countries, the democracy that is being 
SURPRWHG LV ³D YHU\ OLPLWHG IRUP´ WKDW ZRXOG EH FRQVLVWHQW ZLWK IRVWHULQJ LWV 
economic benefits. As he explains, the US has an interest in promoting free trade and 
neo-liberalism in which the state has a minimum role in the economic affairs as well 
DV D ³ORZ-LQWHQVLW\´ GHPRFUDF\ ZLWK ZHDNHU SROLWLFDO LQVWLWXWLRQV 6PLWK 000  
After going through the first set of literature, one could easily conclude that it 
is difficult to assert that the US truly has sought to promote democracy either due to 
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its foreign policy ideals or for pragmatic reasons. There have been too many 
instances where the US opposed democratically elected government in foreign 
countries. In addition to this, the US still pursues friendly policies with authoritarian 
regimes, especially in the Middle East, that support other US security interests. The 
third group of literature, which uses a critical approach, has over-emphasized 
economics as a main motivation that shapes US foreign policy. (Walker, 2008: 53) 
As Walker (2008: 53) has also argued, the main argument of critical theorists are not 
FRQYLQFLQJ EHFDXVH WKHUH DUH H[DPSOHV OLNH &OLQWRQ¶V KHDY\ LQYROYHPHQW LQ +DLWL LQ 
1994, which occurred not because of economic interests but at least partly because of 
his desire to export democracy. Besides this, there is also the example of the 
Marshall Plan after World War II, which was used to combat communism and 
successfully promote democracy in the European continent. It can be seen that the 
second set of literatures depicts a mix record of the US democracy promotion, 
arguing that the US is interested in promoting democracy in those countries where its 
interests in promoting democracy does not conflict with other vital interests. 
However, this literature suffers some limitations in the domain of post-9/11 oil 
politics.  
 
2.2 Defining Key Concepts: 
2.2.1 Democracy: 
Democracy is a contested concept, since scholars have not been able to develop a 
single definition of democracy. As a UHVXOW VFKRODUV ³«GLIIHU RQ KRZ WR FODVVLI\ 
specific regimes, the conditions for making and consolidating democracy, and the 
FRQVHTXHQFHV RI GHPRFUDF\ IRU SHDFH DQG GHYHORSPHQW´ 'LDPRQG 1  
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Whitehead (2002: 14) argues that there has been variation in defining democracy 
RYHU WLPH VLQFH ³«WKH RXWHU ERXQGDULHV RI WKH FRQFHSW DUH « WR D VLJQLILFDQW  
H[WHQW PDOOHDEOH DQG QHJRWLDEOH´   
Huntington (1991: 6) argues that, until the 1970s, the debate that prevailed 
over defining democracy occurred between a classical definition of democracy, 
ZKLFK PHDQV GLUHFW UXOH E\ WKH SHRSOH DQG 6FKXPSHWHU¶V GHILQLWLRQ RI GHPRFUDF\ 
ZKLFK LV WKDW ³«WKH Seople have the opportunity of accepting or refusing the men 
ZKR DUH WR UXOH WKHP´ $IWHU WKH 10V WKH LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ RI 6FKXPSHWHU¶V 
GHPRFUDF\ EHFDPH ZLGHO\ GLIIXVHG DPRQJ VFKRODUV +XQWLQJWRQ 11  'DKO¶V 
(2000: 26) claim, which can explain the vicWRU\ RI 6FKXPSHWHU¶V GHILQLWLRQ RI 
democracy, is that ideal democracy, which is direct participation of all citizens in the 
system of governance over them, is not feasible with the creation of nation-states 
because, unlike in city-states with a small citizenry, all citizens of nation-states 
cannot govern directly.  Instead, a polyarchal system or representative democracy, 
which Dahl has called it as actual democracy, is the best system of governance 
available in which citizens can, with the help elections, select their rulers or state 
RIILFLDOV DQG ³«KROG WKHP DFFRXQWDEOH «E\ GLVPLVVLQJ WKHP VR WR VSHDN LQ 
VXEVHTXHQW HOHFWLRQV´ 'DKO 000  
The concept of democracy, according to Diamond (1999: 8), can be classified 
into four types. The first one is electoral democracy, a minimalist notion, and the 
second one is liberal democracy. A third category, which he called a mid-range 
conception, can be placed between electoral democracy and liberal democracy. A 
IRUWK DSSURDFK FDOOHG ³SVHXGR-GHPRFUDF\´ LV OHVV democratic than minimalist 
approach, but is clearly distinct from authoritarianism.   
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Electoral democracy is the minimalist conception of democracy, which is also 
UHIHUUHG WR DV ³SURFHGXUDO´ GHPRFUDF\ E\ +XQWLQJWRQ 11  +H H[SODLQV ³7KH 
central procedure of democracy is the selection of leaders through competitive 
HOHFWLRQV E\ WKH SHRSOH WKH\ JRYHUQ´ +XQWLQJWRQ 11  3U]HZRUVNL DQG HW DO 
1 0 WDNH WKH VDPH DSSURDFK H[SODLQLQJ GHPRFUDF\ DV ³D UHJLPH LQ ZKLFK 
governmental offices are filOHG DV D FRQVHTXHQFH RI FRQWHVWHG HOHFWLRQV´ $OWKRXJK 
Huntington and Dahl stress the importance of elections for democracy, they also 
recognize the cruciality of additional political rights to materialize democracy within 
a state. According to Dahl (2000:  WKHVH SROLWLFDO ULJKWV LQFOXGH ³«WKH IUHHGRP 
of expression and assembly, and access to the sources of information not provided by 
WKH VWDWH´ 
  The minimalist definition of democracy has some shortcomings. In this approach, 
the institution of free and fair election is taken as an end rather than a means. Beetham 
(1999: 3), who contests the minimalist approach, argues that the end is democratic rule, and 
institutions, as outlined by Dahl and Huntington, are the means to achieve that end. While 
emphasizLQJ WKH ³IDOODF\ RI HOHFWRUDOLVP´ .DUO 1  DUJXHV WKDW HOHFWRUDO GHPRFUDF\ 
gives more importance to elections than to democracy itself and ignores the fact that 
elections can also marginalize minority groups in terms of their participation in elections or 
their ability to defend their political rights. On the extreme side, if the state of affairs were 
dominated by few elites then this state of affairs would lose its democratic character and be 
called oligarchy (Walker, 2008: 18). Although Huntington (1991: 10) also notes that the 
HOHFWLRQ PLJKW JLYH SRZHU WR WKRVH JRYHUQPHQW RIILFLDOV WKDW ³«PD\ EH LQHIILFLHQW FRUUXSW 
shortsighted, irresponsible, dominated by special interests, and incapable of adopting policies 
GHPDQGHG E\ WKH SXEOLF JRRG´ KH DUJues that this would not make such government as 
³QRQ-GHPRFUDWLF´  
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The shortcomings of electoral democracy have made some scholars to define 
GHPRFUDF\ LQ WHUPV RI ZKDW &ROOLHU DQG /HYLWVN\ 1  FDOOHG DQ ³H[SDQGHG 
SURFHGXUDO´ FRQFHSWLRQ ,Q GHILQLQJ liberal democracy, Diamond (1999: 10) explains 
that this concept of democracy requires three additional elements. The first element 
LV ³«WKH DEVHQFH RI UHVHUYHG GRPDLQ RI SRZHU IRU PLOLWDU\ RU RWKHU DFWRUV QRW 
accountable to the electorate, directly or inGLUHFWO\´ 'LDPRQG 1 10 7KH 
second element is the horizontal accountability of elected government officials to one 
DQRWKHU 'LDPRQG 1 10  7KH WKLUG HOHPHQW LV WKH LQFOXVLRQ RI ³«SROLWLFDO DQG 
civic pluralism as well as for individual and grouS IUHHGRP«´ IRU H[SUHVVLQJ WKHLU 
interests and values (Diamond, 1999: 10). He further maintains that freedom and 
pluralism require effective rule of law that is applied to every citizen equally and, as 
a consequence, ensures equal political and legal rights to all citizens.  In a similar 
IDVKLRQ 'LFNVRQ 1 1 DUJXHV WKDW WKH FRQFHSWLRQ RI GHPRFUDF\ ³« LQFOXGHV 
QRW RQO\ UHJXODU HOHFWLRQV EXW DOVR « EURDGHQHG SROLWLFDO SDUWLFLSDWLRQ VRFLDO MXVWLFH 
DQG UHVSHFW IRU KXPDQ ULJKWV´ 5RELQVRQ 1 -59) takes it further and considers 
KXPDQ ULJKWV FLYLO OLEHUWLHV DQG WKH UXOH RI ODZ ³DQG UHPRYDO RI DQ\ NLQG RI 
discriminations as a pre-UHTXLVLWHV RI GHPRFUDF\´ $FFRUGLQJ WR KLP ³«D VRFLHW\ LV 
democratic to the extent that popular majorities are able to iPSRVH WKHLU VRYHUHLJQW\´ 
(Robinson, 1996: 57-59). However, Dahl (2000: 48-49), who is a proponent of 
procedural definition of democracy, also recognizes the importance of respect for 
KXPDQ ULJKWV LQ D GHPRFUDWLF V\VWHP RI JRYHUQDQFH $FFRUGLQJ WR KLP ³'HPocracy 
LV QRW RQO\ D V\VWHP RI JRYHUQDQFH´ EXW ³«DOVR D V\VWHP RI ULJKWV´ 'DKO 000 -
49). Beetham (1999: 93) goes further to incorporate economic and social rights and 
argues that a governing system cannot be considered democratic without including 
economic and social rights in addition to political rights.   
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In elaborating on midrange conceptions, Diamond (1999: 13) argues that this 
approach also gives equal emphasis to elections and basic freedom of expression and 
DVVRFLDWLRQ EXW LW DOORZV ³«IRU FRQVtrictions in citizenship rights and a porous, 
LQVHFXUH UXOH RI ODZ´ ,Q RWKHU ZRUG IUHHGRP VKRXOG EH H[WHQGHG WR D OHYHO WKDW 
HQVXUHV IUHH DQG IDLU HOHFWLRQV +H FLWHV /LQ]¶V 1 1 GHILQLWLRQ RI GHPRFUDF\ 
which includes all the components of liberaO GHPRFUDF\ EXW ³«OHDYHV RSHQ WKH 
H[WHQW WR ZKLFK FLYLO OLEHUWLHV RWKHUZLVH EH SURWHFWHG´ /LQ] 1 1 VWDWHV WKDW 
democratic governments are those that ensure human rights in their states even if 
they might violate when confronted with terrorism or anti-system challenges. 
+RZHYHU /LQ] DQG 6WHSDQ 1 1 DOVR VWLSXODWHV WKDW ³EDVLF IUHHGRPV WR FRQWHVW 
politically remain unquestioned and the rights guaranteed in the constitution are not 
UHVWULFWHG´  
Donnell (1996: 34- ZKLOH DGRSWLQJ 'DKO¶V FRQFept of democracy, adds 
³«IXUWKHU SURFHGXUDO UHTXLUHPHQWV WKDW HOHFWHG RIILFLDOV KDYH PHDQLQJIXO SRZHU´ 
(Diamond, 1999: 14). By emphasizing the institutionalization of elections, he 
LQFOXGHV WKH UHVHUYHG GRPDLQV RI SRZHU DQG DUJXHV WKDW ³«SRO\DUFK\ FHQWHUV on the 
LQVWLWXWLRQDOL]DWLRQ RI HOHFWLRQV UDWKHU WKDQ PRUH EURDGO\ RQ WKH UXOH RI ODZ´ 
'LDPRQG 1 1 %\ DQ LQVWLWXWLRQ KH PHDQV ³«D UHJXODUL]HG SDWWHUQ RI 
interaction that is known, practiced, and accepted (if not necessarily approved) by 
actors who expect to continue interacting under the rules sanctioned and backed by 
WKDW SDWWHUQ´ %\ WDNLQJ WKH VRFLRORJLFDO SHUVSHFWLYH KH DUJXHV WKDW LQVWLWXWLRQV DUH 
taken for granted and regulate expectations and behavior the existence of which are 
not questioned (Jepperson, 1992: 143-63). 
Pseudodemocracy is defined by Diamond (1999: 15) as a polity that has less 
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of a democratic character than the minimalist conception but is clearly distinct from 
an authoritarian regime. In explicating the difference between pseudodemocracies 
and authoritarian regimes, Diamond (1999: 16) explains that pseudodemocracies are 
WROHUDQW WR ³«UHDO DQG RSSRVLWLRQ WR WKH UXOLQJ SDUW\´ XQOLNH LQ DXWKRULWDULDQ 
regimes. Diamond, Linz and Lipset (1989: xviii) call such regimes 
pseudodemocrDFLHV ³«EHFDXVH WKH H[LVWHQFH RI IRUPDOO\ GHPRFUDWLF SROLWLFDO 
LQVWLWXWLRQV VXFK DV PXOWLSDUW\ HOHFWRUDO FRPSHWLWLRQ PDVNV«WKH UHDOLW\ RI 
DXWKRULWDULDQ GRPLQDWLRQ´ 'LDPRQG 1 1-16). On the other hand, the 
authoritarian regime may permit a certain scope of freedom by allowing civil 
societies to exist or by giving some level of autonomy to the judiciary, but forbids 
OHJDO DQG LQGHSHQGHQW RSSRVLWLRQ SDUWLHV %HFDXVH RI WKLV DXWKRULWDULDQ UHJLPHV GRQ¶W 
qualify as real democracies. He further maintains that, by using this approach, 
3VHXGRGHPRFUDF\ FDQ UDQJH IURP VHPL GHPRFUDFLHV WR 6DUWRUL¶V 1 0-237) 
³KHJHPRQLF SDUW\ V\VWHP´ 'LDPRQG 1 1   
Likewise, the lack of consensus on the definition of democracy also prevails 
in US policy making, which causes problems in coordinating democracy-related 
programmes and assessing US democracy assistance (Epstein, Serafino and Miko, 
2007: 4-5). The Senate Foreign Operations Appropriation Committee Report for 
FY2006 also points out the same concern, stating WKDW ³«WKH 6WDWH 'HSDUWPHQW DQG 
86$,' GR QRW VKDUH D FRPPRQ GHILQLWLRQ RI D GHPRFUDF\ SURJUDP´ (SVWHLQ 
Serafino and Miko, 2007, 5). In the following year, the Committee of the Senate 
Appropriations Committee Report for FY2007 states the following: 
«LQ WKH DFW µWKH SURPRWLRQ RI GHPRFUDF\¶ WR LQFOXGH SURJUDPV WKDW 
support good governance, human rights, independent media, and the 
rule of law, and otherwise strengthen the capacity of democratic 
political parties, NGOs, and citizens to support the development of 
democratic states, institutions and practices that are responsible and 
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accountable to citizens (Epstein, Susan B., Nina M. Serafino, and 
Francis T. Miko. 2007: 6). 
 
$V DOVR H[SUHVVHG LQ ³)< 00-2009 Department of State and USAID 
6WUDWHJLF 3ODQ´ ³HOHFWLRQV DORQH ZLOO QRW VHFXUH IUHHGRP´ 'HPRFUDF\ VKRXOG DOVR 
LQFOXGH ³«WKH UXOH RI ODZ OLPLWV RQ WKH DEVROXWH SRZHU RI WKH VWDWH IUHH VSHHFK 
freedom of worship, freedom of association, equal justice, respect for women, and 
respect for private properW\´ 86 'HSDUWPHQW RI 6WDWH DQG 86 $JHQF\ IRU 
International Development Strategic Plan, 2003: 19).  Failing to include these 
FRPSRQHQWV ZRXOG PDNH GHPRFUDF\ ³«D YHKLFOH IRU « W\UDQQ\´ 86 'HSDUWPHQW RI 
State and US Agency for International Development strategic plan, 2003: 19). 
Keeping these facts in mind, one finds that the US perception of democracy is in line 
with the liberal approach to defining democracy. However, Kopstein (2006: 89) 
SRLQWV RXW WKDW KROGLQJ IUHH DQG IDLU HOHFWLRQV LV YLHZHG DV ³WKH DSRtheosis of 
GHPRFUDF\´ E\ DFDGHPLFV DQG 86 RIILFLDOV WKH SURPRWHUV RI GHPRFUDF\ VXSSRUW 
domestic-election monitoring organizations and the training and funding of political 
parties, NGOs and civil societies to meet this objective.  
7KH 86$,' DQG '26¶V DSSUoach to democratization in each country differs 
DFFRUGLQJ WR WKH FKDOOHQJHV SUHVHQWHG WKHUH DV RXWOLQHG LQ ³)< 00-2012 
'HSDUWPHQW RI 6WDWH DQG 86$,' 6WUDWHJLF 3ODQ´ $FFRUGLQJO\ WKH FRXQWULHV DUH 
divided into four groups. Table: 1 explains the country category and the USAID and 
'26 VWUDWHJLHV XQGHU WKH JRDO RI ³*RYHUQLQJ -XVWO\ DQG 'HPRFUDWLFDOO\´ 
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Table. I: Country Category, and USAID and DOS strategies under the goal of 
*RYHUQLQJ -XVWO\ DQG 'HPRFUDWLFDOO\´ 
Source: FY 2007-2012 Department of State and USAID Strategic Plan 
 
 
  
 
As it can be seen from the above table, the approach to defining democracy in 
their democratization process differs according to each country category. Hence, this 
research is not using the strict definition of liberal democracy, since the research here 
intends to test whether the US has the same level of interest of promoting democracy 
in those countries that export oil to the US as it has in promoting democracy in non-
oil exporting countries.  However, the approach of democracy in this research should 
at least satisfy the criteria of the minimalist definition of democracy or electoral 
democracy proposed by Huntington (1991: 6) and Dahl (2000: 26) who stresses the 
importance of elections and additional political rights. These additional rights are the 
freedom of expression and assembly and access to the sources of information not 
provided by the state (Dahl, 2000: 26). 
 
2.2.2 Promotion of Democracy: 
Schmitter and Brouwe 1 11 GHILQH ³3URPRWLRQ RI 'HPRFUDF\´ E\ FRQVLGHULQJ 
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LW DV ³«D VXEVHW RI DFWLYLWLHV LQ ZKDW KDV EHHQ ODEHOHG DV WKH LQWHUQDWLRQDO FRQWH[W RU 
LQWHUQDWLRQDO GLPHQVLRQV RI GHPRFUDWL]DWLRQ«´ 7KH\ GHILQH GHPRFUDF\ SURPRWLRQ 
as: 
Democracy Promotion consists of all overt and voluntary activities 
adopted, supported, and (directly or indirectly) implemented by 
(public or private) foreign actors explicitly designed to contribute to 
the political liberalization of autocratic regimes and the subsequent 
democratization of autocratic regimes in specific recipient countries 
(Schmitter and Brouwe, 1999: 12). 
 
However, Schmitter and Brouwer (1999: 12) also claim that the definition 
GRHV QRW LQFOXGH WKH ³FRYHUW DFWLYLWLHV´ DQG ³LQGLUHFW DFWLYLWLHV´ RI IRUHLJQ GHPRFUDF\ 
SURPRWHUV VLQFH VXFK DFWLYLWLHV DUH LPSRVVLEOH WR ³REVHUYH DQG DQDO\]H´ 6FKPLWWHU 
and Brouwe, 1999: 12-13).  
While defining democracy promotion, Carothers (2009: 5) takes it into further 
step and categorizes it into two approaches, i.e. the political approach and 
developmental approach. According to Carothers (2009: 7), the political approach is 
based on a Dahlian conception of democracy and is centered on the promotion of 
³«JHQXLQH FRPSHWLWLYH HOHFWLRQV DQG VXIILFLHQW UHVSHFW IRU SROLWLFDO DQG FLYLO 
rigKWV«´ LQ DQ DXWRFUDWLF FRXQWU\ +H IXUWKHU DUJXHV WKDW LQ WKH SROLWLFDO DSSURDFK 
GHPRFUDF\ DVVLVWDQFH PLJKW DOVR LQFOXGH SURPRWLQJ ³«LQVWLWXWLRQDO IHDWXUHV VXFK DV 
DQ LQGHSHQGHQW MXGLFLDU\ VWURQJ OHJLVODWXUH RU LQGHSHQGHQW PHGLD«´ &DURWKHUV 
2009: 7). According to this approach, democracy promotion is done through political 
and financial support to political actors and supporting important state institutions 
VXFK DV ³«DQ LQGHSHQGHQW HOHFWRUDO FRPPLVVLRQ DQ LQGHSHQGHQW MXGLFLDU\ RU 
LQGHSHQGHQW PHGLD«´ &DURWKHUV 00  
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On the other hand, the developmental approach also takes socio-economic 
factors into consideration and gives equal emphases to economic and social rights 
(Carothers, 2009: 8). Carothers (2009: 8) explains that both democracy and 
socioeconomic developments are mutually inclusive, part of a complex causal 
relationship. He argues that the developmental approach of democracy assistance 
UHOLHV RQ ³«LQGLUHFW PHWKRGV RI DVVLVWLQJ GHPRFUDF\«´ EHFDXVH WKH SURSRQHQWV RI 
this approach believe that assisting socioeconomic development would lead to 
democratization of a non-democratic country (Carothers, 2009: 9). Hence, they give 
importance to capacity building and good governance instead of political openness 
(Carothers, 2009: 9). 
My research relies on the political approach to defining democracy promotion 
as set forth by Carothers (2009: 6-8). The reason is that the political approach gives 
³«GLUHFW DWWHQWLRQ WR WKH GRPDLQ RI SROLWLFDO FRPSHWLWLRQ²the institutional 
framework for competition, the degree of actual political freedom in practice, the 
FDSDFLWLHV DQG DFWLRQV RI WKH NH\ SROLWLFDO DFWRUV LQYROYHG DQG VR IRUWK´ &DURWKHUV 
2009: 9). On the other hand, the developmental approach also allows for indirect 
methods of democracy assistance by supporting the socioeconomic development of a 
country. Hence, it is hard to measure democracy promotion by using the 
developmental approach. As Carothers (2009: 8) has also argued, the proponents of 
GHYHORSPHQWDO DSSURDFK DUH ³«XVXDOO\ TXLWH IRUJLYLQJ RI its shortcomings on the 
GHPRFUDF\ IURQW´ 
 
2.2.3 Tools for US promotion of democracy: 
In this section, the tools for promoting democracy are discussed based on the 
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foreign countries (Meernik, 1996: 391). During the cold war, the US used the 
military interventions in Greece, South Korea, South Vietnam, Lebanon, El Salvador 
and many other countries for promoting democracy (Peceny, 1999: 2). Although this 
means of promoting democracy is rarely practiced now, there are still examples of 
the use of coercion in promoting democracy after 9/11. The most obvious examples 
are the invasion in Afghanistan and Iraq, where the US intervened in the name of 
democracy.  
Non-coercive means include foreign assistance or democracy assistance by 
governmental organizations and it is the most prominent tool for promoting 
democracy. This includes the transferring of material resources and technical 
expertise that can help to foster democratization in the recipient countries. The US 
governmental organizations that are involved in democracy promotion activities are 
the Department of State, the US Agency for International Development (USAID), the 
Departments of Defense and Justice, and the Broadcasting Board of Governors 
(Epstein, Serafino, and Miko, 2007: 18).  Beside government agencies, the US also 
gives funds to numerous US-based NGOs that are working abroad to promote 
democracy, such as the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and The Asia 
Foundation (Epstein, Serafino, and Miko, 2007: 18). As also pointed by Kopstein 
00  ZKR FRQWHQGV WKDW KROGLQJ D IUHH DQG IDLU HOHFWLRQ LV YLHZHG DV ³WKH 
DSRWKHRVLV RI GHPRFUDF\´ E\ DFDGHPLFV DQG WKH 86 officials,  democracy promoters 
support domestic-election monitoring organizations, and the training and funding of 
political parties, NGOs and civil societies to meet this objective. The most important 
US federal agency involved in foreign assistance is the US Agency for International 
Development (USAID), which has a primary responsibility to work on the ground by 
VXSSRUWLQJ WKH GHYHORSPHQW RI GHPRFUDWLF LQVWLWXWLRQV DQG RUJDQL]LQJ ³«WUDLQLQJ 
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and support to citizens, officials, and civil society organizatiRQV´ &RPPLWWHH RQ 
Evaluation of USAID Democracy Assistance Programs. 2008: 18-19). The US 
Agency for International Development (USAID) was established as a result of the 
Foreign Assistance Act in 1961 when it merged with the US Government assistance 
progrDPV DQG EHFDPH 86 JRYHUQPHQW¶V OHDG LQWHUQDWLRQDO GHYHORSPHQW DQG 
humanitarian assistance agency. The USAID remained a relatively independent US 
federal agency. However, the USAID receives foreign policy guidance from the State 
Department. Under the framewRUN RI ³)< 00-2009 the Department of State and 
WKH 8QLWHG 6WDWHV $JHQF\ IRU ,QWHUQDWLRQDO 'HYHORSPHQW 86$,' 6WUDWHJLF 3ODQ´ 
DQG ³)< 00-01 'HSDUWPHQW RI 6WDWH DQG 86$,' 6WUDWHJLF 3ODQ´ WKH 
Department of State and USAID work jointly in coordination with other relevant 
state organizations to ensure synergy between the US foreign policy and 
development programs that takes a guiding principle from National Security Strategy 
issued by US presidents.  
As depicted from the figure, the gray area represents traditional diplomacy, 
which includes political dialogue, unilateral declarations and economic 
conditionality. Political dialogue is done by way of bargaining with the targeted 
states (Stahn and Hullen, 2007: 5). This process helps democracy promoter to 
develop and manipulate the mix of incentives and disincentives by using a carrot or 
stick approach (Stahn and Hullen, 2007: 5). Adesnik and McFaul (2006: 8) are of the 
YLHZ WKDW WKH 86 E\ EHFRPLQJ FORVHU WR DQ DXWKRULWDULDQ UHJLPH ³H[HUWV HIIHFWLYH 
pressurH IRU SROLWLFDO OLEHUDOL]DWLRQ´ 7KH\ FLWHG WKH H[DPSOH RI 5HDJDQ¶V SROLF\ LQ 
the Philippines and South Korea, where he exerted pressure on these countries to 
liberalize their regimes (Adesnik and McFaul, 2006: 11). Conditionality, which may 
also be considered as an extension of political dialogue, operates by threatening 
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targeted states of imposing sanctions or promising rewards geared towards 
democratizing targeted countries. Hendrickson (1994: 19) argues that US uses 
sanctions as an important tool to isolate undemocratic governments economically to 
the extent that targeted countries have no option but to submit to the democratic 
conditions set by the US. Economic sanctions were used against Haiti in 1991 for 
four years, Iraq throughout 1990s and in Yugoslavia in early 1990s (Walker, 2008: 
29). However, Hendrickson (1994: 19) doubts the effectiveness of this tool. The use 
of incentives or carrots is also employed by the US while using the tool of 
conditionality. For example, democratization-related conditions can be included by 
the US in provision of political, financial or economic support to targeted countries. 
Democracy promoters also use unilateral declarations to influence the reputation of 
targeted countries. This is done by means of voicing their criticism or praising the 
democratic reforms in targeted countries (Stahn and Hullen, 2007: 5). 
 
2.2.4 Energy Security: 
The concept of energy security may have different meanings to different countries 
depending upon their position in the value chain (World Economic Forum, 2006: 9). 
The usual definition of Energy Security is narrowly focused on the security of energy 
supply, which is also the definition used by NATO.  Within this context, Nagy 
(2009: 298 GHILQHV HQHUJ\ VHFXULW\ DV DQ DELOLW\ WR KDYH ³«DFFHVV to the energy 
VRXUFHV WUDQVSRUW URXWHV SRZHU SODQWV HWF´ 6iH] 00  KDV DOVR WDNHQ WKH 
vulnerability of price fluctuation into consideration and defines energy security as 
³«WKH DELOLW\ RI D FRXQWU\ WR PLQLPL]H YXOQHUDELOLW\ WR VXSSO\ LQWHUUXSWLons and price 
LQFUHDVHV LQ HQHUJ\ SURYLVLRQ´ .DOLFNL DQG *ROGZ\Q 00  DOVR GHILQH HQHUJ\ 
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security from the US point of view as: 
In more specific terms, it is the provision of affordable, reliable, 
diverse and ample supplies of oil and gas (and their future 
equivalents)-to the United States, its allies, and its partners-and 
adequate infrastructure to deliver these supplies to markets. 
 
In the above definition, Kalicki and Goldwyn (2005) identify three factors of 
energy security, i.e. affordable, reliable, and diverse and ample supplies of energy. 
Affordable energy supplies mean having an access to energy supplies at reasonable 
and stable price. Reliable energy supplies refer to energy sources that are less prone 
to disruption. Diverse and ample supplies refer to ensuring access to different forms 
of energy from the largest numbers of supplier countries.  
Since this research is concerned with US energy security, which is the 
ZRUOG¶V VLQJOH ODUJHVW HQHUJ\ FRQVXPHU FRXQWU\ DQG LV KHDYLO\ GHSHQGHQW RQ 
imported oil supply from foreign countries, this research focuses on supply security, 
which is an ability to ensure the non-GLVUXSWLYH VXSSO\ RI ³«UHDVRQDEO\-priced 
HQHUJ\«RQ GHPDQG´ 6HH :RUOG (FRQRPLF )RUXP 00  $V WKH 86 QHHGV RLO 
for both its economic and military power, a better definition of energy security can 
be formulated by linking energy security to national power. Kalicki and Goldwyn 
00  IRUPXODWH WKLV OLQN DQG GHILQH HQHUJ\ VHFXULW\ DV ³«DVVXUDQFH RI WKH DELOLW\ 
to access the energy resources required for the continued development of national 
SRZHU´ 7KLV UHVHDUFK UHOLHV RQ WKH GHILQLWLRQ RI HQHUJ\ VHFXULW\ WKDW FRPELQHV WKH 
security-of-supply approach and links it to the national power of the US. Hence, 
energy security can be defined as the ability to ensure a non-disrupted supply of 
energy from foreign countries that requires for the continued development of national 
power. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
3.1 Theory: 
3.1.1 Materialist Theory of Democracy Promotion: 
 Wolff and Wurm (2011: 86- SURSRVH ³0DWHULDOLVW Theory of Democracy 
3URPRWLRQ´ which, they argue, is derived from a rationalist perspective. According 
WR WKHP GHPRFUDF\ SURPRWLRQ ³«LV RQH LQVWUXPHQW DPRQJ RWKHUV WKDW LV DSSOLHG WR 
WKH H[WHQW WKDW LW FRQWULEXWHV WR WKH µUHDO¶ DLPV WKDW JXLGH IRUHLJQ SROLF\´ :ROII DQG 
Wurm, 2011: 87). They derive the conclusion from the arguments of Carothers 
(1999: 16) who analyzes a semirealists approach of democracy promotion, Schraeder 
00  1 ZKR WULHV WR FUHDWH D GLVWLQFWLRQ EHWZHHQ WKH ³QRUPDWLYH JRDO RI 
GHPRFUDF\´ DQG WKH ³FHQWUDO IRUHign policy inWHUHVWV´ and McFaul (2005: 158) who 
argues that democracy promotion is an important yet secondary goal of the US 
foreign policy interests. Carothers (1999: 16) argues that the role of democracy 
promotion in US foreign policy has increased since mid-1980s. However, this role 
was one of the several foreign policy interests of US, and other important economic 
and/or political interests dominate if democracy promotion contradicts with them 
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(Carothers, 1999: 16). Schraeder (2003: 33) takes the same approach stating that the 
SULQFLSOH RI ³«GHPRFUDF\ SURPRWLRQ KDV QHYHU DFKLHYHG WKH VWDWXV RI SULQFLSDO 
IRUHLJQ SROLF\ LQWHUHVW RI QRUWKHUQ LQGXVWULDOL]HG GHPRFUDFLHV´  +H FLWHV WKH H[DPSOH 
of US foreign policy during the Cold War and argues that the strategic interests were 
the main driver of US foreign policy since the US was in an ideological competition 
with the Soviet Union (Schraeder, 2003: 33). For this, Peceny (1999: 2) argues that 
WKH 86 ³«KDV RIWHQ DOOLHG LWVHOI ZLWK EUXWDOO\ UHSUHVVLYH UHJLPHV rather than with 
libHUDO RSSRQHQWV RI VXFK UHJLPHV´ According to McFaul (2005: 158), the US 
presidents in power were more interested in short-term economic, security and/or 
political goals compare with long-term strategic objectives of democracy promotion. 
+H IXUWKHU PDLQWDLQV WKDW WKH 86 ZDV DOZD\V ³«VHOHFWLYH DERXW ZKHQ DQG ZKHUH WR 
SURPRWH GHPRFUDF\´ 0F)DXO 00 1 +H VXSSRUWV KLV DUJXPHQW E\ FLWLQJ WKH 
examples of Franklin Roosevelt and Ronald Reagan who focused their policy of 
democracy promotion in selected countries where democracy promotion would bring 
vital strategic benefits (McFaul, 2005: 158). He also maintains that the Bush 
administration, despite its passionate policy of promoting democracy, has been 
supporting democrats in selected countries where democratization and liberalization 
of politics would bring vital strategic benefits to the US (McFaul, 2005: 158). 
7KH VWDUWLQJ SRLQW RI :ROII DQG :XUP¶V 011 -87) explanation of 
³PDWHULDOLVW WKHRU\ RI GHPRFUDF\ SURPRWLRQ´ LV D XWLOLWDULDQ explanation based on 
.DQW¶V ³3HUSHWXDO 3HDFH´ ,I ³GHPRFUDWLF SHDFH WKHRU\´ LV WDNHQ WR WKH QDUURZHU OHYHO 
of security-based interests, one can argue that democracy promoters take democracy 
promotion as an instrument in order to ensure their security interest by making its 
surrounding environment peaceful (Wolff and Wurm, 2011: 83). However, this 
32 
 
instrument, according to Wolff and Wurm (2011: 80), is only rational to use 
whenever conditions are favorable. These conditions, as outlined by Wolff and 
Wurm (2011 0 DUH ³«VKRUW WHUP SURVSHFWV RI VXFFHVV ORZ ULVNV KLJK 
asymmetries in relative power, and selective incentives or close international 
FRRSHUDWLRQ´ :ROII DQG :XUP 011 -83) go further to utilize neo-classical 
realism and commercial liberalism while explaining their arguments. Neoclassical 
realism takes both external and internal variables, and stresses the importance of 
³V\VWHPLF SUHVVXUH´ DQG ³UHODWLYH PDWHULDO FDSDELOLWLHV´ LQ IRUHLJQ SROLF\ PDNLQJ 
(Rose, 1998: 146). However, Rose (1998: 146 DUJXHV WKDW WKLV LPSDFW ³«LV LQGLUHFW 
and complex because systemic pressures must be translated through intervening 
YDULDEOHV DW WKH XQLW OHYHO´ +H IXUWKHU PDLQWDLQV WKDW WKH SHUFHSWLRQ RI SROLF\ PDNHUV 
has greater impact on foreign policy making (Rose, 1998: 146). Keeping in view 
these arguments, Wolff and Wurm (2011: 83) argue that democracy promotion 
becomes an important instrument if democracy promoters belieYH LQ µ'HPRFUDWLF 
3HDFH 7KHRU\¶ Since democracy promotion is a long-term strategic endeavor, 
conflicting with other short-term vital strategic interests would reduce its relative 
importance (Wolff and Wurm, 2011: 83). Commercial liberalism replaces security 
interests with economic interests but have the same theoretical structure as that of 
Neoclassical Realism (Wolff and Wurm, 2011: 83). Democracy promotion can be 
one of all possible instruments to acquire economic benefits from economic 
OLEHUDOL]DWLRQ +RZHYHU GHPRFUDF\ SURPRWLRQ LQ WKLV VHQVH ³«GHSHQGV XSRQ FDVH-
specific and cost-benefit calcuODWLRQV´ :ROII DQG :XUP 011  
While taking US energy security into consideration, an argument could be 
developed based on the materialist theory that the US places more importance to its 
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energy security then promoting democracy in oil-exporting countries. This is because 
oil is a very important variable for US economy and security.  As natural resources-
rich countries are more prone to civil war, democracy promotion could become a 
very risky endeavor. Hence, the US finds promoting stability in oil-exporting 
countries more important than promoting democracy. A more detailed explanation is 
given in the following section. 
 
3.1.2 The Materialist Theory of Democracy Promotion and US Energy Security:  
Despite the US efforts to reduce its oil demand, increase efficiency and 
diversification of energy sources, petroleum still remains the most important source 
of energy and an indispensable variable for the security and the economy of the 
United States. As we can see from Figure 2, there are different forms of energy that 
the US consumes. However, petroleum is the most important source of energy that 
the US consumes.   
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Information Agency, 2011). According to the estimation provided by Kalicki and 
*ROGZ\Q¶V 00 1 WKH 86 HFRQRP\ DQG VHFXULW\ ZLOO KHDYLO\ dependent upon 
foreign oil-rich countries, especially in the Middle Eastern countries, for the next 20 
years. 
 
 
Figure III: Petroleum Consumption, Production, and Import Trends (1949-
2009) 
Source: Energy Information Administration (EIA), database. 
 
Figure 4 shows that huge portion of oil is used in industrial and transportation 
sector, which are the backbone of US economic growth. It can be seen that the major 
portion of oil is consumed by transportation sector. In 2005, transportation sector 
consumed 65 percent of the US oil consumption. A reduction in oil supply to 
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transportation would increase the risk of major economic problems (Government 
Accountability Office, 2007: 2). 
 
 
Figure IV: Annual US Oil Consumption, by Sector, 1949-2009 
Source: Energy Information Administration (EIA), database. 
 
The importance of oil for the national security of the US and maintaining 
hegemony in the world cannot be ignored. Senior Pentagon official John J. Young Jr. 
claimed that the Department of Defense is the biggest oil consumer in the US that 
consumes 300 million barrels of oil per day (Miles, 2006). Three quarters of oil is 
used to keep the military mobilized (Miles, 2006). John J. Young Jr. also showed his 
worries that the stability of oil supply for military purposes cannot be guaranteed 
since 58 percent of US oil is imported from abroad (Miles, 2006). 
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Figure V: US Department of Defense and Non-Defense Agencies Fiscal Years 
1975-2009 
Source: Energy Information Administration (EIA), database. 
 
As oil remains the most important source of energy indispensable both for 
HFRQRPLF SURVSHULW\ DQG PLOLWDU\ SRZHU D GHFOLQH LQ RLO VXSSO\ ZRXOG ZHDNHQ ³« 
the US global economic and political influence and the ability of the United States to 
pay for US miliWDU\ IRUFHV´ &UDQH DQG HW DO 00 1 
In order to ensure its energy security, US has taken different initiative to 
curtail its demand for oil, use it efficiently, develop hydrogen or less carbon intensive 
technology and diversify the source of energy (Kalicki and Goldwyn, 2005: 1). 
However, Kalicki and Goldwyn (2005: 1) estimated that US needs to rely on foreign 
oil, especially from the Middle East region, for the next 20 years. While energy 
security is crucial in the eyes of US policy makers, it is important here to know 
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whether US policy makers compromise on other foreign policy principles if they 
conflict with its energy security interest.  
As mentioned earlier, Democracy promotion is a long term endeavor and the 
rewards of democracy promotion do not come quickly. However, democracy 
promotion in oil-rich countries would become even more expensive and troublesome 
for the US. According to "Oil-as-Spoil" thesis, revenues from the extraction of 
natural resources cause political instability in countries either because of greed-
driven rebellion or resentment over the distribution pattern of the revenue. Collier 
and Hoeffler (1998: 53-54) have also observed that natural-resources rich countries 
are more likely to have greed-driven rebellions compared to non-natural resources 
rich countries. One of the World Bank studies reveals that oil exporting countries 
"...are forty times more likely to be engaged in civil war than countries that do not" 
(Forest and Sousa, 2006: 5). Beside these, Rose (2001, 356) has also concluded, by 
analyzing pooled time-series cross-national data from 113 states between 1971 and 
1997, that natural resources, especially oil, have anti-democratic character and the scope 
of democracy in natural resources-rich countries is minimum compared to other 
countries. Keeping in view that oil-rich countries are not only more prone to civil war 
but also the scope of democratization is minimum, democracy promotion endeavor 
becomes even more time taking and highly insecure.  Based on rationalist approach, 
the cost of democracy promotion in those countries become very high and it would 
take a longer time to produce any results. Beside this, the vulnerability of US oil 
imports from those countries also adds substantially to the cost of democracy 
promotion in those countries. As a consequent, the US becomes less inclined to 
promote democracy in oil-rich countries, especially in those countries with US oil 
dependency. Hence, the US oil interest makes it compromise on its policy of 
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democracy promotion and exert less or no pressure on those countries that export oil 
to the US to liberalize their political system. 
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CHAPTER IV: 
 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
 
In this chapter, statistical methodologies have been employed to test the relationship 
between US external energy dependency and its efforts to promote democracy 
abroad. The methodologies have been applied to the data of all those countries who 
have been receiving USAID funding for democracy-related programmes after the 
event of September 11, 2001. Data employed consists not only of countries who have 
been exporting oil to the US, but also includes countries who do not export oil to the 
US but receive democracy promotional grants from the US. 
The statistical techniques employed consist of testing the equality of average 
USAID support for democracy-related programmes between sub-groups of countries 
in the sample. The analysis has been further extended to a more formal estimation of 
linear regression model. The details have been discussed in the following section.  
4.1 Hypotheses: 
From the discussion of the materialist theory of democracy promotion in Chapter III, 
it can be deduced that energy security is indispensable both for the US economic and 
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military power and therefore US is heavily dependent upon the imports of oil. In 
order to ensure sustainable flow of oil from foreign countries, it is possible that the 
US may compromise in its support to promote democracy in those countries due to 
its oil dependency. This leads to an interesting formulation of a hypothesis: US 
would be willing to extend more support to promote democracy when its energy 
security concerns are not compromised. 
In order to test this hypothesis statistically, a null (H0) and alternative 
hypothesis H1 have been formulated. In statistics, H0 is formulated with the 
expectation that it can be rejected with sufficient level of confidence against the H1. 
With this background, we have formulated the following null hypothesis: 
Null Hypothesis H0: There is no relationship between US oil dependency 
and the extent of funding to promote democracy. In other words, the average funding 
to support democracy in a country is not compromised by US oil dependency on that 
country. The null hypothesis is tested against the following alternative hypothesis H1. 
Alternative Hypothesis H1: The US oil dependency on a foreign country 
does negatively influence US efforts to promote democracy in that country. In other 
words, the more the US is dependent on its oil imports from a particular country, the 
lesser the US is willing to promote democracy in that country.  
 
4.2 Methodology: 
The null hypothesis H0 is being tested in two stages. In the first stage, the equality of 
USAID average funding for democracy-related programmes between the group of 
countries with US oil dependency and the group of countries with US non-oil 
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dependency has been tested. Statistical technique to test the equality of two 
population means has been employed by using a simple student t-test. In the second 
stage, a linear multiple regression model has also been developed to explain the 
variation in the USAID funding for democracy-related programmes by including 
several independent variables. One of the key explanatory variables employed is the 
US oil imports. The inclusion of this variable would enable us to examine the causal 
relationship between the extents of the US funding to promote democracy to its oil 
dependency in terms of imports of oil. The framework will allow us to test the key 
research question of this thesis, i.e. whether US post 9/11 foreign policy objective to 
promote democracy have been compromised or not due to its concerns about energy 
security.  
 
4.3 Sample Period:  
Data employed for the analyses relates to the years from 2002 to 2005. One of the 
justification for choosing these years is that the operational definition of the USAID 
funding on democracy-related programmes in each country after 2005, has changed. 
The data from 2006 and onward on USAID funding for democracy-related 
programmes is not reported separately. Rather it has been reported by the US 
Department of the State as a joint State-USAID budget submission in partnership 
with other US government departments and agencies that are working on democracy 
promotion in foreign countries, such as Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), 
Department of Labor, Department of Justice, Millennium Challenge Corporation 
(MCC), Peace Corps, and Department of Commerce. (see US Department of State, 
2007: iii and US Department of State and US Agency for International Development, 
2003: 21). Furthermore, the data for individual countries is not being reported by 
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USAID for the earlier years. Therefore, the present analysis is being restricted to the 
years between 2002 and 2005.  
As it can be noted, President Bush was serving his first tenure during the 
proposed time-frame of this research when democracy promotion in foreign 
countries was highly prioritized. As the literature (for example Lynch, 2008: 197 and 
Dalacoura, 2005: 963) also support the view that the Bush administration during its 
first term was heavily influenced by the neo-conservative world-view of democratic 
world and prioritized democracy promotion in foreign countries in order to tackle 
terrorism. Therefore, our sample would also help to analyze the relationship between 
the US energy security and its democracy promotion at the time when democracy 
promotion was highly prioritized. 1 
   
4.4 Description of Data: 
The data in the sample has further being sub-grouped into two samples. Sample A 
consists of those countries that export oil to the US and sample B consists of those 
countries that do not export oil to the US between 2002 and 2005. In these samples, 
Afghanistan, West Bank and Gaza, and Iraq cases have not been included because 
these countries went through extra-ordinary circumstances and have been treated as 
OUTLIERS in our analysis. The pooled time series data has 34 countries in the 
sample A with 99 observations and 58 countries in sample B with 188 observations.  
The dataset of both samples consist of data on USAID funding for 
                                                          
1
 As the allocation of the USAID foreign assistance of any year is based on the request given by the 
administration to the congress in the previous year, it can be assumed that the USAID funding for 
democracy-related programmes in 2005 is based on the priorities of the first term of Bush 
administration. 
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democracy-related programmes per capita in each foreign country and percentage 
ratio of annual oil imports in barrels. For the multiple regression analysis, several 
other explanatory variables have also been included in the model and will be 
discussed later.2  
USAID funding for democracy-related programmes is measured by using the 
86$,'¶s budget allocation in US dollars for democratic elections, governance and 
human rights related programs in foreign countries. The democracy-related 
SURJUDPPHV RI 86$,' IDOOV XQGHU WKH XPEUHOOD RI WKH ³'HPRFUDF\ DQG *RYHUQDQFH´ 
programme (US Agency for International Development, 2005: 133-134, and US 
Agency for International Development, 2007: 29-32). This program is composed of 
four strategic areas, which are Rule of Law and Human Rights, Institutions of 
Democratic and Accountable Governance, Political Freedom and Competition, and 
Citizen Participation and Advocacy. (US Agency for International Development, 
2005: 133-134, and US Agency for International Development, 2007: 31-32). For 
each country, data is collected by aggregating USAID funding for all the programs 
UHODWHG WR WKH DERYH PHQWLRQHG IRXU VWUDWHJLF DUHDV RI ³'HPRFUDF\ DQG *RYHUQDQFH´ 
SURJUDP RI HDFK FRXQWU\ LQ D JLYHQ \HDU 7KH GDWD LV FROOHFWHG IURP WKH ³86$,' 
%XGJHW -XVWLILFDWLRQ WR WKH &RQJUHVV´ RI )< 00 DQG )< 00 86 $JHQF\ IRU 
International Development, 2005: 193-657, and US Agency for International 
Development, 2007: 31-32). In order to make comparison across countries, the 
USAID funding for democracy promotion per capita is used. The data on population 
of each country are taken from the US Census Bureau (US Bureau of the Census) to 
calculate per capita USAID funding for democracy promotion. 
                                                          
2
 Security Effectiveness and Government Effectiveness are our control variables which are explained 
later in this section. 
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The US dependency on oil is measured as the ratio of annual oil imports in 
barrels from a particular country to the total annual US imports of oil in barrels. Data 
on annual US oil imports in barrels is taken from the database of US Energy 
Information Administration (US Energy Information Administration).  
Data on Security Effectiveness as one of the control variables in the 
regression analysis is taken from the Polity IV State Fragility data set. The data set 
LQFOXGHV D FRPSRQHQW FDOOHG ³6HFXULW\ (IIHFWLYHQHVV VFRUH´ 7KLV VFRUH LV EDVHG RQ 
³5HVLGXDO :DU VFRUH´ RI HDFK FRXQWULHV ZKLFK LV ³D PHDVXUH RI JHQHUDO VHFXULW\ 
and vulnerability to political YLROHQFH LQ D FRXQWU\´ 0DUVKDOO DQG %HQMDPLQ 00 
1 7R FDOFXODWH WKH VFRUH RI HDFK FRXQWU\ WKUHH LQGLFDWRUV DUH XVHG ³D VXP RI 
annual scores for all wars in which the country is directly involved for each 
continuous period of armed conflict; (b) interim years of no war between periods of 
armed conflict; and (c) years of peace, or no war, since the end of most recent war 
SHULRG´ 0DUVKDOO DQG %HQMDPLQ 00 1 7KLs variable is an ordinal ranking from 
0 to 3, where 0 means the highest level of security effectiveness and 3 means the 
lowest level of security effectiveness (for more details see Marshall and Benjamin, 
2009: 31). So a higher value would indicate lower security effectiveness. 
Data on the other control variable in the regression model, Government 
Effectiveness, is taken from the World Bank Worldwide Governance indicators, 
which measure six dimensions of governance and one of them is Government 
(IIHFWLYHQHVV ³7KH LQGLFDWRUV DUH EDVHG RQ VHYHUDO KXQGUHG LQGLYLGXDO YDULDEOHV 
measuring perceptions of governance, drawn from 33 separate data sources 
FRQVWUXFWHG E\ 0 GLIIHUHQW RUJDQL]DWLRQV´ 7KH 6WDWH 'HSDUWPHQW 010  
*RYHUQPHQW (IIHFWLYHQHVV LV XVHG WR DVVHVV ³WKH TXDOLW\ RI SXEOLF VHUYLFHV WKH 
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quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political 
pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility 
RI WKH JRYHUQPHQW
V FRPPLWPHQW WR VXFK SROLFLHV´ 'DQLHO .UDD\ DQG 0DVWUX]]L 
2010: 4). The Index uses a scale from -2.5 to 2.5 with higher average values equaling 
higher quality of Government Effectiveness (for more details see Daniel, Kraay and 
Mastruzzi, 2010). 
 
4.5 Descriptive Statistics of the Data:  
Some of the descriptive measures of data employed in the analysis are reported in the 
table 2 below.  
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Table II: Summary Statistics of Data 
 
Variable n Mean Standard 
Error 
Median Minimum Maximum 
Sample A (Countries with US Oil Dependency) 
 
USAID funding 
for democracy-
related 
programmes 
per capita 
99 0.495 
 
0.061 
 
0.284 
 
0.003 2.992 
US Oil Import 
ratio 
99 0.0121 
 
0.003 
 
0.0007 
 
1.66E-06 
 
0.134 
Security 
Effectiveness 
99 1.152 
 
0.116 
 
1 
 
0 3 
Government 
Effectiveness 
99 -0.450 
 
0.053 
 
-0.417 
 
-1.718 
 
0.807 
 
Sample B (Countries with no US Oil Dependency) 
 
USAID funding 
for democracy-
related 
programmes 
per capita 
188 
 
1.507 
 
0.223 
 
0.507 
 
0.012 28.942 
 
US Oil Import 
ratio 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
Security 
Effectiveness 
186 0.839 
 
0.073 
 
0 
 
0 
 
3 
Government 
Effectiveness 
184 -0.675 0.035 
 
-0.608 
 
-2.109 
 
0.566 
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As we can see from table 2, the countries with US oil dependency (sample A) 
received, on the average, less than one third of the average of USAID funding for 
democracy-related programmes than the countries with no US oil dependency 
(sample B). By using the empirical rule we can say ( തܺ േ ͵ߜ௑ത); that 99% of the cases 
in sample A are between 0.312 and 0.678 and 99% of the cases in sample B are 
between 0.838 and 2.2176. Therefore, it is very evident that the USAID funding for 
democracy-related programmes in sample A is less than in sample B.  
Furthermore, the numerical mean value of Security Effectiveness is higher in 
sample A than in sample B, meaning that among those countries that do not export 
oil to the US, this Security Effectiveness, on the average, is better than among those 
countries that do export oil to the US. On the contrary, the mean value of 
Government Effectiveness of sample A is higher than that of sample B, which 
explains that the Government Effectiveness is higher in those countries that export 
oil to the US compared to those countries that do not export oil to the US. Since US 
policy to support democracy may also be influenced by those two measures beside 
oil dependency, the net impact of oil import on US funding can be assessed more 
scientifically in a multiple regression framework when the impact of Security 
Effectiveness and Government Effectiveness is being controlled.  
 
4.6 Testing Difference between Two Means (t-test): 
It has been argued, in this thesis, that the US may not allocate more funding to 
promote democracy in countries that export oil to the US due to its energy security 
concerns. USAID funding for democracy-related programmes in each country is 
being used as an indicator of the US democracy promotion intent in each country. 
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Although the US uses various tools to promote democracy in foreign countries that 
are either coercive or non-coercive means, the USAID funding for democracy-related 
programmes is used in this study because of the readily availability of quantifiable 
data. According to Carothers (1999: 6), foreign assistance specifically for 
³GHPRFUDF\ RSHQLQJ´ RU ³GHPRFUDWLF WUDQVLWLRQ´ LV WKH PRVW REYLRXV DQG VLJQLILFDQW 
means for promoting democracy abroad. The government organizations that are 
involved in democracy promotion activities are the Department of State, USAID, the 
Departments of Defense and Justice, and the Broadcasting Board of Governors 
(Epstein, Serafino, and Miko, 2007: 18). However, USAID is the most prominent 
and the leading state agency that also works on grounds for democracy assistance in 
foreign countries (Epstein, Serafino, and Miko, 2007: 18). 
In this section, hypothesis about the equality of average USAID funding for 
democracy-related programmes between two groups of countries in the sample is 
being tested. The sample data has been divided into two sub-groups, sample A 
consisting of countries exporting oil to the US and sample B consisting of countries 
that do not export oil (see table 2). The null hypothesis H0 of the equality between 
averages funding between these groups has been tested against an alternative 
hypothesis that less funding is allocated to countries with US oil-dependency. The 
hypothesis is tested using ONE-TAIL t-test. If null hypothesis is successfully 
rejected, the proposed alternative hypothesis shall be accepted as true, i.e. the US is 
less inclined to promote democracy in countries that export oil to the US than in 
those countries that do not export oil to the US. Based on this, the following are the 
statements of null hypothesis and alternative hypothesis: 
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H0 : PA t PB 
H1 : PA < PB                    «1 
Where  
PA = USAID funding mean for democracy-related programmes of Population A 
(countries that export oil to the US) 
PB = USAID funding mean for democracy-related programmes of Population B 
(countries that do not export oil to the US) 
In order to test the H0, one-tail t-test has been employed because the variances 
of populations are unknown. The test statistic employed is as follows: 
ݐ ൌ ሺ௑തಲି௑തಳሻି଴ඨೄಲమ೙ಲାೄಳమ೙ಳ                   « 
Where തܺA = Average USAID funding for democracy-related programme in sample A തܺB= Average USAID funding for democracy-related programme in sample B 
஺ܵ= Standard Error of sample A ܵ஻= Standard Error of sample B ݊஺= Number of observations in sample A ݊஻= Number of observations in sample B 
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 7KH GHFLVLRQ UXOH LV WR UHMHFW WKH QXOO K\SRWKHVLV LI WKH FDOFXODWHG YDOXH RI ³W´ 
LQ HTXDWLRQ  LV OHVV WKDQ WKH FULWLFDO YDOXH RI ³W´ DW Į OHvel of significance and v 
degrees of freedom: Reject H0 if t <- tĮ. 
 7KH VLJQLILFDQFH OHYHO RI Į LV WDNHQ DV  LQ WKH WHVW 7KH FULWLFDO YDOXH RI 
t with 5% of level of significance is -1.645 with 276 degrees of freedom (v = nA + nB 
± 2). By substituting all values in equation (2) taken from table 1, the calculated 
value of t is -55.7889. As the value of t is less than the value of t.050= -1.645, we can 
be 95% confident to reject null hypothesis.  Hence, it can be concluded that the US 
spends less to promote democracy in those countries on which the US has oil 
dependency compared with other countries with 95% level of confidence. As the p-
value in this test is less than 0.001, null hypothesis can also be rejected with 99% or 
more level of confidence.  
 Some experts (for example Grigory, 2010 and McFaul, 2004: 2) argued 
that despite the US is more interested in promoting democracy is post-Soviet states, 
oil is the most important factor that influence the decision of the US to promote 
democracy in post-Soviet states. Based on this argument, it would be interesting to 
employ the same one tail t-test to estimate the variation of USAID funding for 
democracy-related programmes between those post-Soviet countries that export oil to 
the US compared with those countries that do not export oil to the US. The following 
table is the descriptive statistics of USAID funding for the sub groups of post-Soviet 
states: 
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Table III: Summary Statistics of USAID Funding For Democracy-related 
Programmes in Post-Soviet States 
 
 
Post-Soviet States in Sample A Post-Soviet States in Sample B തܺA   = 0.890 
SA   = 0.196 
nA   =21 
തܺB  =1.145 
SB  = 0.213 
nB  = 27  
 
It is evident from the table III, USAID funding, on average, for democracy-
related programmes in post-Soviet states of sample A is less than that of sample B. 
The following are the statements of null and alternative hypotheses: 
H0 : PA   t PB  
H1 : PA  < PB  
 7KH VLJQLILFDQFH OHYHO Į LV again taken at 5%. The critical value of t table 
with 46 degrees of freedom is -1.679. The value of calculated t, using values from 
table 3, is estimated as -4.302. As the value of clculated t is less than the critical 
value of tĮ, the null hypothesis H0 can be rejected at a significance level of 5%, i.e. 
we can reject with 95% confidence level that the USAID allocates equal funds for 
democracy promotion to post-Soviet states of both population A and B. Hence, the 
alternative hypothesis holds true that the US spends less to promote democracy in 
those post-Soviet states that export oil to the US compared with those post-Soviet 
states that do not export oil to the US. As the p-value in this experiment is less than 
0.001, null hypothesis can also be rejected at 99% of confidence level. 
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 The results of the above methodology do support our main thesis, 
however, the approach is simple in its application and has some limitations. Multiple 
regression model has also been employed to further address these limitations.    
 
4.7 Regression Analysis: 
4.7.1 Model: 
For multiple regression analysis, the following model has been employed. 
Y = ER + EX + JZ + G'  ';  H                                  
 
« 
 
 
Where Y is the dependent variable of the model, which is the USAID per 
capita funding for democracy-related programmes and X is the primary independent 
variable, i.e., oil dependency measured as the percentage of oil imports from a 
particular country to the total oil imports of the US. Accodring to our maintained 
thesis, we expect that Y is inversely related to X (E < 0). In order to measure the net 
impact of variable X on Y, several control variables (Z) have also been included in 
the model as control independent variables. These include the measure of Security 
Effectiveness (Z1) and Government Effectiveness (Z2).  Furthermore, dummy 
variables (D) have also been employed in the model to test several hypotheses about 
the sub-groups of countries. The significance of the interaction of these dummy 
variables (D) with our main independent variable (X) have also been included in the 
model to further explore their significance. ER, E, J, G DQG  are the parameters of the 
model.   These parameters shall be estimated by using regression analysis. The 
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random error term3, H, is assumed to be normally distributed with the following 
standard assumptions: (see Sincich, 2008: 598-599) 
E[Hi] = 0 
E[Hi2] = ᪵ 2 
E[Hi Hj] = 0 IRU DOO L  M 
After this brief description of the model, we would like to shed some light on 
the use of the dummy variables. The intercept dummy variables (D) are included to 
estimate the difference in the intercept of the regression model for a sub-group. And 
slope dummy variables (DX) are used to estimate the change in the slope of the 
variable X for a sub group. In the context of our analysis, intercept dummy variable 
enables us to estimate the variation of USAID funding for democracy-related 
programmes between the sub-groups of countries and other countries of our sample, 
while slope dummy, which is a multiplicative form of dummy, enables us to estimate 
the differential of the relationship of USAID funding for democracy-related 
programmes per capita and US oil dependency within a sub-group of countries of our 
sample. Further explanation about the dummy variables used in our analysis is 
provided in section 4.7.5. If we take expectation of the both sides in our linear 
regression model in equation 3,  
E(Y|D=0) = ER + EX    
 E(Y|D=1) = (ER + G) + (E+;   as E(H) = 0 by assumption. 
                                                          
3
 Random error is assumed to capture the variation Y that is not explained by the variables in the 
model.  
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:KHUH ' LV D TXDOLWDWLYH YDULDEOH WDNLQJ YDOXHV ³RQH´ IRU D SDUWLFXODU VXE-
JURXS RI FRXQWULHV LQ WKH VDPSOH DQG LV ³]HUR´ IRU DOO RWKHU FRXQWULHV 6R SDUDPHWHU G 
measures the average differential in funding (Y) which is independent of oil export 
(X) for the designated sub-group of countries. On the other hand,  measures the 
slope differential, i.e. how a change in oil imports (X) affects the average funding 
(Y) for the particular sub-group of countries. After this explanation of our multiple 
regression model, we will now discuss the variables employed in the model in more 
detail.  
 
4.7.2 Dependent Variable: 
The dependent variable (Y) is the promotion of democracy in each foreign country. 
The USAID funding for democracy-related programmes per capita is used as an 
indicator. Although the US uses various tools to promote democracy in foreign 
countries that are either coercive or non-coercive means, the USAID bilateral foreign 
assistance for democracy-related programmes is used in this study because of the 
readily availability of quantified data and is more appropriate for the proposed 
methods of this study. According to Carothers (1999: 6), foreign assistance 
VSHFLILFDOO\ IRU ³GHPRFUDF\ RSHQLQJ´ RU ³GHPRFUDWLF WUDQVLWLRQ´ LV WKH PRVW REYLRXV 
and the most significant means for promoting democracy abroad. The government 
organizations that involve in democracy promotion activities are the Department of 
State, USAID, the Departments of Defense and Justice, and the Broadcasting Board 
of Governors (Epstein, Serafino, and Miko, 2007: 18). However, USAID is the most 
prominent and the leading state agency that also works on grounds for democracy 
assistance in foreign countries. Section 4.4 has explained the operationalization of 
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our dependent variables Y and the source of data for this variable (see Section 4.4: 
44-46).    
 
4.7.3 Independent Variable: 
The independent variable (X) is the oil dependency on a foreign country and the 
indicator is the ratio of annual US oil imports in barrels from a particular country to 
the total annual US imports of oil. The inclusion of this variable is central to testing 
our thesis in the regression model. The rationale behind this is that this percentage 
indicates the level of the US oil dependency on a particular foreign country to fulfill 
its energy demand (Svyatets, 2008: 8-9). Higher percentage ratios correspond to 
higher levels of the US oil dependency on that country. Section 4.4 has explained the 
operationalization of our independent variables X and the source of data for this 
variable (see Section 4.4: 44-46). 
 
4.7.4 Control Variables: 
Security Effectiveness is used as a control variable (Z1). It could be inferred from 
Forest and Sousa (2006: 131-143) that the US has been very cautious to promote 
democracy in those oil-rich countries that are not able to achieve effectiveness of 
their internal security. They cited the example of Saudi Arabia and argued that the 
policy of not promoting democracy in those oil exporting countries that have a higher 
level of internal security is a continuation of the US cold war policy, which was also 
reflected in post-9/11 US policy. Hence, it can be assumed that Security 
Effectiveness affects negatively to USAID funding for democracy-related 
programmes. This variable is an ordinal ranging from 0 to 3, where 0 means the 
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highest level of security effectiveness and 3 means the lowest level of security 
effectiveness. Section 4.4 has explained the operationalization of our control variable 
Z1 and the source of data for this variable (see Section 4.4: 44-46). 
Government Effectiveness is also used as a control variable (Z2). As 
PHQWLRQHG LQ WKH ³&RQJUHVVLRQDO %XGJHW -XVWLILFDWLRQ 9ROXPH  )25(,*1 
23(5$7,216 011´ WKH 'HSDUWPHQW RI 6WDWH DQG 86$,' XVH WKH *RYHUQPHQW 
Effectiveness Index, taken from the World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators, 
for monitoring and evaluation purposes. Although it is not explicitly expressed in the 
report, it can be assumed that the level of Government Effectiveness also affects the 
decision regarding the USAID funding for democracy-related programmes in a 
particular country.  The Index uses a scale from -2.5 to 2.5 with higher average 
values equal higher quality of governance. Section 4.4 has explained the 
operationalization of our control variable Z2 and the source of data for this variable 
(see Section 4.4: 44-46). 
These two control variables have been included in the model to estimate the 
net impact of oil dependency (X) on US funding for democracy (Y). Furthermore, 
the results for these two variables would also allow us to assess how US support for 
democracy is affected by these two variables given the value X.  
 
4.7.5 Dummy Variable: 
In the regression model, we have also categorized the sample into two sub-groups of 
countries and thereby included two dummy variables. The first such sub-group is for 
all the Near East states in our sample. So the first dummy variable, D1, takes value of 
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³RQH´ LI WKH FRXQWU\ LV D 1HDU (DVW VWDWHV DQG ³]HUR´ RWKHUZLVH :H H[SHFW WKDW WKH 
US is less inclined to promote democracy in the Near Eastern countries, because US 
has stronger economic and security interests in the Near East for which the US has 
developed closer relationship with many autocratic countries in the region. These 
interests include Israel-Palestine conflict, oil security, and cooperation on 
counterterrorism. Since the US is heavily dependent on Middle Eastern oil resources, 
especially from the Persian Gulf, for its energy needs. The US is concerned with 
potential internal insecurity in those countries. As the internal insecurity of oil rich 
countries can arise because of a spillover effect from neighboring countries, the US 
is very cautious and takes a gradual approach to promote democracy in the Middle 
Eastern countries. The US started its Middle Eastern Partnership Initiative program 
(MEPI) after 9/11 to address the problem of reform in the Middle East. As Carothers 
(2005: 2) argued, MEPI cautiously choose to fund those programmes that are 
³XQFRQWURYHUVLDO DQG ODUJHO\ ZRUNLQJ ZLWKLQ WKH ERXQGDULHV VHW E\ $UDE 
JRYHUQPHQWV´ )RU WKLV 0(3, XVHV D JUDGXDO DQG ERWWRP-up approach and relies 
mostly on public diplomacy (for information on public diplomacy see Tuch, 1990: 3-
57). Based on these factors, it is expected that the USAID, on the average, would 
spend less money on the Middle Eastern countries than others. Dummy variable D1 
shall be used to estimate the variation of USAID funding for democracy-related 
programmes between the Near East states and other states.  
The second dummy variable D2 is also included for all post-Soviet states in 
our sample. The justification for including this dummy variable is that we expect that 
the US is more interested in promoting democracy in post-Soviet countries compared 
to other countries. Some scholars believe that the US has greater interest to promote 
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democracy in post-6RYLHW VWDWHV LQ RUGHU WR H[SDQG 1$72 ³«Wo create a Baltic-to-
Black-6HD D[LV WR HQYHORS 5XVVLD´ *ULJRU\ 010 ,Q DGGLWLRQ WR WKLV WKH 86 KDV D 
strategic interests to promote democracy in Russia as democratic Russia would make 
LW D ³UHOLDEOH DQG ODVWLQJ DOO\ RI WKH 8QLWHG 6WDWHV LQ ZRUOG DIIDLUV´ 0F)DXO 00 
2). Failing to consolidate democracy in Russia would strain the US-Russia 
relationship possibly to a confrontational level as it was the case in the twentieth 
century, which would have serious security implications for the US (McFaul, 2004: 
2). The transition of post-Soviet states to democracy was an important post-Cold War 
national security priority for the US (Spence, 2003: 1-2). This security priority can be 
realized from the fact that George Bush and Bill Clinton met with Boris Yeltsin more 
frequently during their term of office (Spence, 2003: 1-2).  The US has also spent a 
huge amount of money for democracy and involved in the domestic affairs in post-
Soviet states (Spence, 2003: 1-2). In 2003 and 2004, Bush administration gave 
masVLYH VXSSRUW IRU GHPRFUDWL]LQJ *HRUJLD DQG 8NUDLQH E\ PHDQV RI ³SUR-
GHPRFUDWLF GLSORPDF\´ DQG DLG &DURWKHUV 00 11 Hence, it can be expected 
based on the above facts that USAID, on average, spends more money for 
democracy-related-programmes on post-Soviet states compared to non-post-Soviet 
states. A dummy variable is used to estimate the level of the USAID funding for 
democracy-related programmes in post-Soviet states compared with other countries. 
For D2, the country is coded 1 if it is a post-Soviet state and 0 otherwise.  
However, it is also important to notice the arguments of Ipek (2007, 95-96) 
and Grigory (2010) that energy security is an important geostrategic interest of the 
US in the region. Hence, it can be expected that US oil dependency in post-Soviet 
states would negatively affect US democracy promotion in those states. As a result, 
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there will be less USAID funding for democracy-related programmes in those post-
Soviet countries on which the US has higher oil dependency and vice versa. In order 
to estimate this variation, a slope dummy D2X, which is a multiplicative form of 
dummy, is used to evaluate the relationship between the US energy security and its 
democracy promotion in post-Soviet states4.  
 
4.7.6 Discussion of Results and Interpretation: 
The sample contains all the countries that receive democracy assistance from the 
United States from 2002 to 2005. The sample size in this analysis is 99. The list of all 
those countries in the sample A is available in appendix A. Microsoft Excel 2010 is 
used to run the regressions. Different combinations of variables have been used and 
the following model has given the best results. 
Y   =    0.714  -  3.857 X**  -  0.128 Z1***  +  0.165 Z2  -  0.414 D1**   
            (0.101)    (1.878)           (0.050)              (0.112)        (0.191)                   
+  0.538 D2***-  28.259 D2X**                                                  ...(4) 
     (0.171)              (13.607) 
 
Standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the .01, .05, 
and .10 levels, respectively. 
F-test=6.716  R2 = 0.305   n = 99 
 
The overall significance of the regression is tested by using F-test of null 
hypothesis (H0) that all the coefficients are zero against the alternative (H1) that at 
least one of the coefficients is not equal to zero. The decision rule is that we can 
reject H0 if ) ! )Į(kí 1, ní k), ³ZKHUH )Į(kí 1, ní k) is the critical F-value at the Į level 
                                                          
4
 The slope dummy D1X was also included in the model but it was not statistically significant, so it 
was excluded from the model.  
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of significance and (kí 1) numerator df and (ní k GHQRPLQDWRU GI´ *XMDUDWL 00 
257). As we can see from the Summary Output in appendix 3, the value of numerator 
df and denominator df is 6 and 92 respectively (see Appendix 3). From the F 
distribution table, we find that the critical F value (FĮ6,92)) at Į=0.05 significance 
level is 2.25 (see Gujarati, 2003: 962-967). As the value of F is 6.716 which is 
greater than FĮ, it can be concluded that null hypothesis H0, i.e. all the coefficient of 
regression are zero, can be rejected at 95% confidence level. By this, we can 
conclude that the test we performed is statistically significant. Since the p-value is 
less than 1%, null hypothesis H0 can also be rejected at less than 1% significance 
level. Adjusted R2 value that explains the percentage of variation in the dependent 
variable by the model is around 26%.  
As we can see from appendix 3, the p-values of X, Z1, D1, D2 and D2X are 
under the 5 percent significance level, as the p-values of X, Z1, D1, D2 and D2X are 
0.043, 0.013, 0.033 and 0.002 respectively. The coefficient of Z2 is significant at 
almost 14 percent significance level (p-value is 0.145). So except for Z2, all other 
coefficients in this model are statistically significant and are different from zero at 
5% level of significance or less.  
The coefficient of the oil dependency variable turned out to be negative, 
which supports our primary thesis. According to the result provided in equation 4, 
USAID funding for democracy-related programmes is decreased by 3.857 US 
Dollars per capita on the average if the ratio of US oil imports from a country to US 
total oil imports annually is increased by 1% on average; other things being equal.  
This implies that the US become less inclined to promote democracy in a country if 
its oil dependency on that country is increasing; other things being equal. This result 
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supports to my thesis that US compromises on its principle of promoting democracy 
abroad if it conflicts with US energy security. This finding runs counter to the 
arguments of Monten (2005: 114) and Lynch (2008: 197), who argued that 
democracy promotion in foreign countries became the first priority of the US foreign 
policy especially during the first tenure of President Bush because of US ideological 
commitment to democratize the world, and Richards (2003: 70), who argues that 
democracy promotion is highly prioritized not only because US ideological 
commitment but it also serves the security interest of the US.   
As for the two control variables in the model, the coefficient of Security 
Effectiveness is negative, which suggests that the USAID spends more money for 
democracy-related programmes in those countries that are better in terms of their 
Security Effectiveness5; other things being equal, (i.e. for given value of all other 
variables in the model). USAID funding for democracy-related programmes per 
capita decreases by 0.127 US dollars on average if the Security Effectiveness score is 
increased by one unit on average; other things being equal. So, the coefficient of 
Security Effectiveness tells us that for a given level of oil imports, the USAID spends 
more on democracy-related programmes when there is more security effectiveness. 
This could be because the US is more cautious in promoting democracy in those oil 
exporting countries that have less Security Effectiveness as the transition to more 
democratic state could increase the insecurity level and endanger political stability in 
those countries, which could also affect US oil-imports security negatively.  
                                                          
5
 Here it is important to recall that Security Effectiveness  is an ordinal ranking from 0 to 3, where 0 
means the highest level of security effectiveness and 3 means the lowest level of security 
effectiveness. (see section 4.4) 
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It can be observed that the coefficient of Government Effectiveness is 
positive, which explains that the USAID allocate more funds to those countries that 
have better government effectiveness; other things being equal. If Government 
Effectiveness is increased by one unit, on average, USAID funding for democracy-
related programmes per capita is increased by 0.165 US dollars; other things being 
equal. As mentioned before, USAID and the Department of State use Government 
Effectiveness Index from World Governance Indicator of World Bank for 
Monitoring and Evaluation purpose. So, the coefficient of Government Effectiveness 
tells us that for a given level of oil imports, the USAID spends more on democracy-
related programmes when there is more Government Effectiveness.  
As per our expectations based on the arguments presented in review chapter 
of this thesis, the coefficient of D1 turned out to be negative that explains that the 
USAID spending is lower in the Near East states than in all other countries in the 
sample. For each Near East states, USAID funding for democracy-related 
programmes per capita is decreased by 0.414 US dollars on average. US is heavily 
dependent on Middle Eastern oil resources, especially in the Persian Gulf region, for 
its energy needs.  
With regards to post-Soviet states, the result is again in accordance with our 
theoretical expectations as the coefficient of D2 is positive. For each post-Soviet 
states, USAID funding for democracy-related programmes per capita is increased by 
0.538 US dollars on average. Since the US is more concerned with the progress of 
democracy in those countries, the USAID spends, on average, more on democracy-
related programmes in those countries than in other countries (for more details recall 
section 4.7.5).  
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By using a slope dummy variable for post-Soviet states (D2X), it is revealed 
that, despite the USAID spending more money on average for democracy-related 
programmes in post-Soviet states, more US oil dependency reduces USAID spending 
in those countries in post-Soviet states. For each post-Soviet states, USAID funding 
for democracy-related programmes per capita is decreased by 28.259 US Dollars on 
average if the ratio of US oil imports from a country to US total oil imports annually 
is increased by 1% on average; other things being equal. This further reinforces our 
thesis about an important linkage between US oil dependency and its interest to 
promote democracy abroad. 
 
4.8 Limitations and Directions for Future Research: 
 
This research focused on democracy assistance only as an instrument of democracy 
promotion. As mentioned previously, it does not include other US means of 
promoting democracy, such as military intervention and conventional diplomacy. 
Because of this limitation, the result obtained from this research could be biased. 
There could be a case where the US used other strategic instruments of promoting 
democracy, such as coercion. This problem might be addressed by including other 
tools of promoting democracy used by the US in future research.  
In this research, only USAID funding for democracy-related programmes is 
included, while funding through other channels, such as other US government 
agencies and US-based NGOs, are not included. This is because of the non-
availability of data on democracy assistance from 2002 to 2005 given by non-USAID 
US government agencies and US-based NGOs in foreign countries.  
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In this research, the time-frame is limited to 2002 to 2005. Hence, the result 
obtained from this research cannot be generalized with confidence to the period after 
2005. This would require expanding the time-frame of the analysis. The data from 
2006 to onward on USAID funding for democracy-related programmes is not 
reported separately. Rather it has been reported by US Department of the State as a 
joint budget submission of all the US government departments and agencies that are 
working on democracy promotion in foreign countries (US Department of State, 
2007: iii). Hence, it may require a separate analysis in which the priorities of all the 
US departments and agencies working on democracy promotion abroad are included. 
  
R2, which is 0.305, is not high. This means that the explanatory power of the 
ratio of US oil imports variable and other variables in the model are not large. Thus, 
the US democracy promotion may also influenced by other factors which are not 
included in the model. For example, only oil is considered in this research despite the 
fact that there are other energy resources, such as gas and coal, on which the US 
depends to fulfill its demand for energy imports. In order to minimize this problem, 
future research should include imports of other energy resources in the model. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
This research is an attempt to contribute to the literature on US democracy promotion 
by exploring an aspect that has not been empirically tested, i.e the relative 
importance of democracy promotion vis-à-vis energy security for US foreign policy 
makers. As it is explained in Chapter I, the importance of US democracy promotion 
as a foreign policy principle elevated considerably after the tragic event of 9/11. This 
has been because the US started including democracy promotion in foreign countries 
among its national security objectives. On the other hand, the event of 9/11 also 
created fears of the potential vulnerability of US energy security. Since the issues of 
both the democracy promotion in non-democratic countries and energy security 
have become prime concerns for US policymakers, there is a need to know whether 
the US is genuinely committed to promoting democracy in oil-rich countries or 
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whether US oil interests trump its policy of promoting democracy. Most of the 
available literatures focus on the post-9/11 US promotion of democracy and energy 
security separately. Some studies such as Forest and Sousa (2006), Carothers (2004) 
and Ipek (2007) have examined the interaction between oil imports and democracy 
promotion. However, they are limited to being single in-depth case studies, and so 
the existing literature lacks methodologically rigorous conclusions. The aim of the 
study is to address this limitation and develop a methodologically robust conclusion 
by using quantitative methods that test the relationship between the US oil 
dependency and the promotion of democracy in those countries that export oil to the 
US after 9/11. 
The thesis illustrates that, as hypothesized by using the materialist theory of 
democracy promotion, US oil dependency on a foreign country negatively influence 
US interest of promoting democracy in that country. Two statistical methods are used 
to derive this conclusion. USAID funding for democracy-related programmes per 
capita in each country is used as an indicator of US democracy promotion. As we 
utilize hypothesis testing by using t-test, it is estimated that USAID spends, on 
average, less on democracy-related programmes per capita in those countries that 
export oil to the US compared to other countries. The cross-sectional time-series 
regression model explores the relationship between USAID funding for democracy-
related programmes per capita (a dependent variable) and the percentage ratio of oil 
imports to the total US imports. The predicted sign of  the coefficient to describe the 
relationship between USAID democracy assistance and oil was negative which 
explaines that US oil dependency on a particular country negatively affects US 
interests for democracy promotion in that country. This is because resources-rich 
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countries are more prone to internal insecurity compared with other countries. As 
democracy promotion is a long term endeavor and the rewards of democracy 
promotion do not come quickly, democracy promotion endeavor in oil-rich countries 
becomes even more time taking and highly insecure which may disrupt oil supply to 
the US. In order to avoid civil wars in oil-rich countries that can cause disruption of 
oil supply, the US has less interest in promoting democracy in those countries from 
where the US imports oil. Hence, it can be concluded that the US oil interest makes it 
compromise on its foreign policy principle of democracy promotion abroad and exert 
less or no pressure on those countries that export oil to the US to liberalize their 
political system. 
As explained in section 4.8, there are some limitations of our analyses. 
Nevertheless, our analyses are important and may contribute significantly to the 
literature on US democracy promotion and US energy security. Limitations of our 
analyses provide opportunities for future research on US democracy promotion and 
its energy security.  
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APPENDIX A: DATA SET OF SAMPLE A 
 
Country Y X Z1 Z2 D1 D2 D2X Year 
Angola 0.503229 2.8795% 3 -1.1286942 0 0 0.000000000000 2002 
Albania 2.240676 0.0106% 0 -0.6487899 0 0 0.000000000000 2005 
Angola 0.429589 3.0282% 3 -1.0509606 0 0 0.000000000000 2003 
Angola 0.291104 2.4050% 3 -1.2391114 0 0 0.000000000000 2004 
Angola 0.290255 3.4484% 3 -1.0193398 0 0 0.000000000000 2005 
Azerbaijan 0.720213 0.0002% 2 -0.9348933 0 1 0.000001663285 2002 
Azerbaijan 1.122943 0.0101% 2 -0.8457917 0 1 0.000100600611 2004 
Azerbaijan 1.606374 0.0112% 2 -0.6802908 0 1 0.000112475355 2005 
Belarus 0.283585 0.0524% 0 -1.1791835 0 1 0.000523788303 2004 
Belarus 0.625234 0.0252% 0 -1.1130313 0 1 0.000252120600 2005 
Bolivia 0.690088 0.0065% 0 -0.5371399 0 0 0.000000000000 2004 
Bolivia 1.480997 0.0105% 0 -0.7712761 0 0 0.000000000000 2005 
Bulgaria 1.484638 0.0106% 0 0.0975371 0 0 0.000000000000 2002 
Bulgaria 1.137526 0.0342% 0 0.0091873 0 0 0.000000000000 2003 
Bulgaria 1.331476 0.0200% 0 0.0924974 0 0 0.000000000000 2004 
Bulgaria 1.524627 0.0108% 0 0.2614003 0 0 0.000000000000 2005 
Burma 0.140927 0.0067% 3 -1.2637103 0 0 0.000000000000 2003 
China 0.00308 0.1692% 2 -0.0460069 0 0 0.000000000000 2004 
Colombia 0.552695 2.2587% 2 -0.4412606 0 0 0.000000000000 2002 
Colombia 0.594781 1.5877% 2 -0.1880676 0 0 0.000000000000 2003 
Colombia 0.488733 1.3388% 2 -0.0577926 0 0 0.000000000000 2004 
Colombia 0.546474 1.4291% 2 -0.1095627 0 0 0.000000000000 2005 
Croatia 1.798474 0.0013% 1 0.3965994 0 0 0.000000000000 2002 
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Democratic 
Republic of 
the Congo 
0.116215 0.1060% 2 -1.5066324 0 0 0.000000000000 2004 
Democratic 
Republic of 
the Congo 
0.106577 0.0137% 2 -1.7183051 0 0 0.000000000000 2005 
Ecuador 0.630297 0.9567% 0 -0.8124619 0 0 0.000000000000 2002 
Ecuador 0.654037 1.1784% 0 -0.710787 0 0 0.000000000000 2003 
Ecuador 0.740253 1.8632% 0 -0.8248081 0 0 0.000000000000 2004 
Ecuador 0.670091 2.0608% 0 -0.9651397 0 0 0.000000000000 2005 
Egypt 0.138482 0.0919% 1 -0.4168916 1 0 0.000000000000 2002 
Egypt 0.191362 0.0713% 1 -0.3238879 1 0 0.000000000000 2003 
Egypt 0.521761 0.1070% 1 -0.2732352 1 0 0.000000000000 2004 
Egypt 0.048247 0.1067% 1 -0.4623519 1 0 0.000000000000 2005 
El Salvador 0.733768 0.0027% 2 -0.2225183 0 0 0.000000000000 2004 
El Salvador 0.39018 0.0132% 2 -0.3146108 0 0 0.000000000000 2005 
Georgia 2.471472 0.0038% 0 -0.8070237 0 1 0.000037542729 2002 
Georgia 2.090886 0.0295% 0 -0.7190081 0 1 0.000295319938 2003 
Georgia 2.513479 0.0004% 0 -0.4090392 0 1 0.000003949198 2004 
Georgia 2.99226 0.0144% 0 -0.3737987 0 1 0.000144240153 2005 
Ghana 0.053336 0.0209% 0 -0.1798132 0 0 0.000000000000 2002 
Ghana 0.123384 0.0206% 0 -0.2467959 0 0 0.000000000000 2003 
Ghana 0.044905 0.0314% 0 -0.2498479 0 0 0.000000000000 2004 
Ghana 0.071932 0.0176% 0 -0.187333 0 0 0.000000000000 2005 
Guatemala 0.260718 0.1996% 2 -0.4984259 0 0 0.000000000000 2002 
Guatemala 0.085286 0.1793% 2 -0.4433461 0 0 0.000000000000 2003 
Guatemala 0.503853 0.1392% 2 -0.6061555 0 0 0.000000000000 2004 
Guatemala 0.623597 0.0783% 2 -0.6515432 0 0 0.000000000000 2005 
Guinea 0.259733 0.0118% 1 -0.9667238 0 0 0.000000000000 2002 
Guinea 0.226714 0.0107% 0 -0.8865484 0 0 0.000000000000 2003 
India 0.013485 0.1781% 3 -0.1142512 0 0 0.000000000000 2002 
India 0.00391 0.1595% 3 -0.036074 0 0 0.000000000000 2003 
India 0.00391 0.0892% 3 -0.016655 0 0 0.000000000000 2004 
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India 0.003208 0.2064% 3 -0.0694754 0 0 0.000000000000 2005 
Indonesia 0.170217 0.4591% 3 -0.528118 0 0 0.000000000000 2002 
Indonesia 0.177523 0.3040% 3 -0.5167625 0 0 0.000000000000 2003 
Indonesia 0.064844 0.3424% 3 -0.3711075 0 0 0.000000000000 2004 
Indonesia 0.136643 0.1731% 3 -0.452643 0 0 0.000000000000 2005 
Jamaica 0.387244 0.0035% 0 -0.0085265 0 0 0.000000000000 2002 
Jamaica 0.552525 0.0150% 0 0.2266043 0 0 0.000000000000 2004 
Jamaica 0.904436 0.0162% 0 -0.0343523 0 0 0.000000000000 2005 
Kazakhstan 0.4106 0.0934% 0 -0.5976705 0 1 0.000933673435 2004 
Kazakhstan 0.382922 0.1515% 0 -0.5346264 0 1 0.001514921164 2005 
Mexico 0.094653 13.4131
% 
0 0.3019332 0 0 0.000000000000 2002 
Mexico 0.098826 13.2350
% 
0 0.1737731 0 0 0.000000000000 2003 
Mexico 0.09516 12.6629
% 
0 0.1457052 0 0 0.000000000000 2004 
Mexico 0.126597 12.1216
% 
0 0.0087327 0 0 0.000000000000 2005 
Morocco 0.033839 0.0620% 0 0.0294762 1 0 0.000000000000 2004 
Morocco 0.133106 0.0124% 0 -0.2170924 1 0 0.000000000000 2005 
Nigeria 0.119397 5.3879% 2 -0.9828682 0 0 0.000000000000 2002 
Nigeria 0.071223 7.0707% 2 -0.8658275 0 0 0.000000000000 2003 
Nigeria 0.028023 8.6706% 2 -0.8726087 0 0 0.000000000000 2004 
Nigeria 0.061908 8.4994% 2 -0.8169563 0 0 0.000000000000 2005 
Panama 0.401209 0.0121% 0 -0.0125017 0 0 0.000000000000 2002 
Peru 0.635272 0.2009% 2 -0.3220624 0 0 0.000000000000 2002 
Peru 0.378264 0.1280% 2 -0.3896234 0 0 0.000000000000 2003 
Peru 0.478627 0.1387% 2 -0.4460387 0 0 0.000000000000 2004 
Peru 0.335321 0.2582% 2 -0.60376 0 0 0.000000000000 2005 
Philippines 0.116104 0.0012% 3 -0.0653258 0 0 0.000000000000 2005 
Romania 0.409689 0.1298% 0 -0.1475597 0 0 0.000000000000 2002 
Romania 0.349702 0.0482% 0 -0.1476292 0 0 0.000000000000 2003 
Romania 0.325338 0.0051% 0 0.0035068 0 0 0.000000000000 2004 
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Romania 0.259042 0.0307% 0 -0.0759241 0 0 0.000000000000 2005 
Russia 0.150886 1.8222% 2 -0.2947173 0 1 0.018222480111 2002 
Russia 0.140013 2.0711% 2 -0.2186425 0 1 0.020710595172 2003 
Russia 0.227263 2.2687% 2 -0.2485299 0 1 0.022687308360 2004 
Russia 0.279432 2.9903% 2 -0.3599359 0 1 0.029903061427 2005 
South Africa 0.157975 0.0056% 2 0.6159231 0 0 0.000000000000 2002 
South Africa 0.123715 0.0091% 2 0.6663114 0 0 0.000000000000 2003 
South Africa 0.110731 0.0017% 2 0.7457413 0 0 0.000000000000 2004 
South Africa 0.130951 0.0064% 2 0.807201 0 0 0.000000000000 2005 
Turkmenistan 0.355349 0.0050% 0 -1.5156664 0 1 0.000049660951 2002 
Turkmenistan 0.233266 0.0004% 0 -1.4826829 0 1 0.000004244386 2003 
Turkmenistan 0.233266 0.0038% 0 -1.6050293 0 1 0.000037829155 2004 
Turkmenistan 0.257281 0.0323% 0 -1.6239535 0 1 0.000323241783 2005 
Ukraine 0.593421 0.0073% 0 -0.5707485 0 1 0.000073164080 2004 
Ukraine 0.997542 0.0177% 0 -0.4626641 0 1 0.000177403402 2005 
Yemen 0.020905 0.0476% 0 -0.735325 1 0 0.000000000000 2003 
Yemen 0.034459 0.0358% 1 -0.9519992 1 0 0.000000000000 2004 
Yemen 0.081594 0.0960% 1 -0.9341493 1 0 0.000000000000 2005 
 
 
Y= USAID funding for democracy-related programmes per capita 
X=Percentage ration of US oil imports from a particular country to total US imports 
Z1=Security Effectiveness 
Z2=Government Effectiveness 
D1=Near East States (Dummy variable) 
D2=Post-Soviet States (Dummy variables) 
D2X= Slope Dummy (D2 multiply by X) 
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APPENDIX B: DATA SET OF SAMPLE B 
 
Country Y X Z1 Z2 Years 
Somalia 0.117142 0.0000% 2 -2.109193421 2004 
Somalia 0.278834 0.0000% 2 -2.108966311 2005 
Somalia 0.178196 0.0000% 2 -1.966327292 2003 
Haiti 1.000476 0.0000% 1 -1.664932192 2004 
Burma 0.049434 0.0000% 3 -1.626336789 2005 
Burma 0.097394 0.0000% 3 -1.616741704 2004 
Liberia 0.80275 0.0000% 2 -1.575092879 2002 
Somalia 0.255714 0.0000% 2 -1.562130147 2002 
Liberia 2.360198 0.0000% 2 -1.554937056 2003 
Liberia 6.080245 0.0000% 2 -1.543497557 2004 
Sudan 0.625315 0.0000% 3 -1.539044993 2005 
Haiti 0.315252 0.0000% 0 -1.538515522 2002 
Sierra Leone 2.478756 0.0000% 2 -1.511662293 2002 
Burundi 0.271428 0.0000% 2 -1.424613191 2003 
Haiti 0.253274 0.0000% 0 -1.410405884 2003 
Burundi 0.440092 0.0000% 2 -1.398392761 2005 
Sierra Leone 2.689398 0.0000% 2 -1.398030372 2003 
Haiti 5.236582 0.0000% 1 -1.395182933 2005 
Burundi 0.442693 0.0000% 2 -1.375130112 2004 
Liberia 6.704588 0.0000% 2 -1.349570923 2005 
Burma 0.133427 0.0000% 3 -1.324049302 2002 
Zimbabwe 0.280855 0.0000% 0 -1.309923015 2005 
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Uzbekistan 0.20814 0.0000% 0 -1.292876497 2005 
Tajikistan 0.697457 0.0000% 1 -1.278285368 2002 
Sudan 0.343543 0.0000% 3 -1.258281682 2004 
Sierra Leone 0.963031 0.0000% 2 -1.257029494 2005 
Tajikistan 0.951942 0.0000% 1 -1.205586696 2003 
Uzbekistan 0.3323434 0.0000% 0 -1.178070627 2002 
Tajikistan 0.524594 0.0000% 1 -1.153985205 2005 
Tajikistan 0.951942 0.0000% 1 -1.130501066 2004 
Sierra Leone 0.823084 0.0000% 2 -1.118077429 2004 
Uzbekistan 0.287269 0.0000% 0 -1.100912969 2003 
Uzbekistan 0.287269 0.0000% 0 -1.088977121 2004 
Timor-Leste 8.60045 0.0000% 2 -1.051512658 2005 
Belarus 0.50204974 0.0000% 0 -1.046951602 2002 
Belarus 0.42109153 0.0000% 0 -1.039928738 2003 
Guinea 0.032774 0.0000% 0 -1.031462697 2005 
Timor-Leste 12.31782 0.0000% 2 -1.030154127 2003 
Nepal 0.20787 0.0000% 2 -1.024287797 2005 
Rwanda 0.208822 0.0000% 2 -1.015711985 2005 
Cambodia 0.964625 0.0000% 2 -0.980579598 2005 
Zambia 0.142609 0.0000% 0 -0.967255528 2005 
Rwanda 0.728545 0.0000% 2 -0.959303962 2002 
Cambodia 1.002293 0.0000% 2 -0.948784889 2004 
Ethiopia 0.070432 0.0000% 2 -0.944336967 2005 
Kyrgyz 
Republic 
1.442595 0.0000% 0 -0.939907897 2005 
Bangladesh 0.038623 0.0000% 0 -0.937186771 2005 
Zimbabwe 0.317681 0.0000% 0 -0.919786384 2004 
Ethiopia 0.744787 0.0000% 2 -0.90142306 2003 
Guinea 0.199622 0.0000% 0 -0.898802496 2004 
Moldova 0.413579 0.0000% 0 -0.860457602 2004 
Bangladesh 0.02293 0.0000% 1 -0.855648925 2004 
Zambia 0.183911 0.0000% 0 -0.848900364 2003 
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Kazakhstan 0.484174 0.0000% 0 -0.847309802 2002 
Paraguay 0.841946 0.0000% 0 -0.835118554 2004 
Cambodia 0.83061 0.0000% 2 -0.83102098 2002 
Cuba 0.797254 0.0000% 0 -0.829637182 2005 
Rwanda 0.289939 0.0000% 2 -0.827507147 2003 
Cambodia 1.006137 0.0000% 2 -0.827409545 2003 
Zambia 0.1843 0.0000% 0 -0.820677016 2002 
Azerbaijan 0.769423 0.0000% 2 -0.819096377 2003 
Nicaragua 1.841035 0.0000% 0 -0.798562301 2005 
Kenya 0.182689 0.0000% 0 -0.798282377 2005 
Nepal 0.172231 0.0000% 2 -0.795849414 2004 
Timor-Leste 13.11316 0.0000% 2 -0.795770216 2002 
Paraguay 0.676394 0.0000% 0 -0.785094382 2005 
Zambia 0.163552 0.0000% 0 -0.781030851 2004 
Kyrgyz 
Republic 
1.473995 0.0000% 0 -0.778521418 2004 
Timor-Leste 10.78374 0.0000% 2 -0.771918119 2004 
Kenya 0.139759 0.0000% 0 -0.754603906 2002 
Kyrgyz 
Republic 
1.416569 0.0000% 0 -0.744881196 2002 
Nicaragua 1.255448 0.0000% 1 -0.733542695 2002 
Moldova 1.467221 0.0000% 0 -0.731661476 2005 
Malawi 0.040765 0.0000% 0 -0.717569771 2005 
Bangladesh 0.02293 0.0000% 1 -0.717520634 2003 
Bangladesh 0.040184 0.0000% 1 -0.711143977 2002 
Kenya 0.152837 0.0000% 0 -0.711104731 2003 
Kyrgyz 
Republic 
1.473995 0.0000% 0 -0.705356061 2003 
Ethiopia 0.029599 0.0000% 2 -0.701586536 2004 
Malawi 0.057305 0.0000% 0 -0.696439762 2004 
Nicaragua 1.18839664 0.0000% 1 -0.692184193 2003 
Nicaragua 1.230988 0.0000% 1 -0.681354871 2004 
Ukraine 0.288138 0.0000% 0 -0.67975055 2002 
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Malawi 0.10072162 0.0000% 0 -0.676181268 2002 
Kenya 0.158565 0.0000% 0 -0.658391087 2004 
Malawi 0.09830585 0.0000% 0 -0.655122457 2003 
Mali 0.110845 0.0000% 0 -0.640814902 2004 
Cuba 1.100384 0.0000% 0 -0.636834964 2004 
Moldova 0.803418 0.0000% 0 -0.634382276 2003 
Honduras 0.549418 0.0000% 0 -0.629627626 2005 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
2.957 0.0000% 1 -0.627178021 2005 
Mali 0.35081186 0.0000% 0 -0.612432612 2002 
Uganda 0.04161828 0.0000% 2 -0.603989574 2002 
Honduras 0.507941 0.0000% 0 -0.603868025 2002 
Benin 0.055415 0.0000% 0 -0.598596829 2005 
Uganda 0.152876 0.0000% 2 -0.597328279 2005 
Mali 0.114309 0.0000% 0 -0.59708778 2005 
Moldova 1.343218 0.0000% 1 -0.596172911 2002 
Kazakhstan 0.4106 0.0000% 0 -0.586302349 2003 
Nepal 0.172231 0.0000% 2 -0.58615131 2003 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
3.051138 0.0000% 1 -0.582560753 2004 
Cuba 0.449172 0.0000% 0 -0.57611016 2002 
Albania 1.880987 0.0000% 0 -0.565505996 2003 
Albania 2.46931274 0.0000% 1 -0.564484699 2002 
Mozambique 0.1249 0.0000% 2 -0.563461196 2003 
Serbia  8.994284 0.0000% 1 -0.55273125 2003 
Honduras 7.61911933 0.0000% 0 -0.541473482 2003 
Guyana 2.494536 0.0000% 0 -0.536149849 2005 
Uganda 0.017148 0.0000% 2 -0.533839999 2004 
Honduras 0.80234 0.0000% 0 -0.533837638 2004 
Rwanda 0.292696 0.0000% 2 -0.526315893 2004 
Dominican 
Republic 
0.569506 0.0000% 0 -0.513725821 2004 
Macedonia 6.289262 0.0000% 0 -0.509747462 2002 
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Madagascar 0.112242 0.0000% 0 -0.509265234 2003 
Pakistan 0.078137 0.0000% 2 -0.505194605 2005 
Nepal 0.170327 0.0000% 1 -0.504250175 2002 
Uganda 0.140111 0.0000% 2 -0.502692668 2003 
Mozambique 0.112593 0.0000% 2 -0.502467379 2004 
Pakistan 0.063469 0.0000% 2 -0.498701263 2004 
Ukraine 0.484884 0.0000% 0 -0.497274409 2003 
Cuba 0.507559 0.0000% 0 -0.486788392 2003 
Pakistan 0.012479 0.0000% 2 -0.486668743 2002 
El Salvador 0.580328 0.0000% 2 -0.484653954 2002 
Mali 0.43322788 0.0000% 0 -0.481015176 2003 
Pakistan 0.063469 0.0000% 2 -0.447062773 2003 
Mozambique 0.088342 0.0000% 2 -0.444357984 2002 
Sri Lanka 0.22575 0.0000% 3 -0.432069714 2004 
Madagascar 0.124956 0.0000% 0 -0.423612277 2002 
Mongolia 0.955899 0.0000% 0 -0.422742916 2004 
Benin 0.25932527 0.0000% 0 -0.412519756 2002 
Tanzania 0.057982 0.0000% 0 -0.408438049 2005 
Sri Lanka 0.211411 0.0000% 3 -0.406365986 2005 
Albania 6.076555 0.0000% 0 -0.39591541 2004 
Lebanon 1.032393 0.0000% 2 -0.391908513 2004 
Madagascar 0.064554 0.0000% 0 -0.388856374 2004 
Tanzania 0.031765 0.0000% 0 -0.385014586 2004 
Dominican 
Republic 
0.5914635 0.0000% 0 -0.3810915 2003 
Mozambique 0.100007 0.0000% 2 -0.377880018 2005 
Dominican 
Republic 
0.593706 0.0000% 0 -0.366744226 2005 
Benin 0.070548 0.0000% 0 -0.35879571 2004 
Tanzania 0.037702 0.0000% 0 -0.351343124 2002 
Lebanon  1.54147 0.0000% 2 -0.346738869 2005 
Macedonia 6.181115 0.0000% 0 -0.344073302 2005 
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Mongolia 0.942082 0.0000% 0 -0.340105561 2005 
Serbia  1.808404 0.0000% 1 -0.337776304 2005 
Macedonia 7.785686 0.0000% 0 -0.322891476 2003 
Tanzania 0.106247 0.0000% 0 -0.31964645 2003 
Bolivia 0.688147 0.0000% 0 -0.317548092 2003 
Dominican 
Republic 
0.59381738 0.0000% 0 -0.310084911 2002 
Guyana 1.916379 0.0000% 1 -0.308730924 2002 
Benin 0.29792794 0.0000% 0 -0.306992994 2003 
Guyana 2.242524 0.0000% 0 -0.29851966 2004 
El Salvador 0.836171 0.0000% 2 -0.285458237 2003 
Mongolia 0.969798 0.0000% 0 -0.281256581 2003 
Armenia 3.135558 0.0000% 0 -0.274800259 2002 
Madagascar 0.027304 0.0000% 0 -0.273104067 2005 
Armenia 2.441274 0.0000% 0 -0.264199882 2003 
Bolivia 1.22915 0.0000% 0 -0.255491047 2002 
Senegal 0.298922 0.0000% 1 -0.246958605 2003 
Guyana 1.723499 0.0000% 0 -0.229672823 2003 
Philippines 0.068629 0.0000% 3 -0.22800594 2004 
Sri Lanka 0.22575 0.0000% 3 -0.208945302 2003 
Mongolia 1.457432 0.0000% 0 -0.191068944 2002 
Serbia  7.470329 0.0000% 1 -0.186293229 2004 
Senegal 0.164272 0.0000% 1 -0.150907433 2004 
Sri Lanka 0.143747 0.0000% 3 -0.129695204 2002 
Senegal 0.199461 0.0000% 1 -0.127237271 2005 
Armenia 2.825471 0.0000% 0 -0.114683226 2004 
Macedonia 5.784073 0.0000% 0 -0.102151906 2004 
Armenia 5.068551 0.0000% 0 -0.05125383 2005 
Panama 0.245611 0.0000% 0 -0.022501992 2003 
Senegal 0.70702131 0.0000% 1 -0.002370527 2002 
Panama 0.322147 0.0000% 0 0.040209867 2004 
Jordan 1.222785 0.0000% 0 0.060635884 2005 
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Namibia 0.510029 0.0000% 0 0.073309837 2002 
Namibia 0.603937 0.0000% 0 0.076902663 2005 
Panama 0.70554 0.0000% 0 0.111990755 2005 
Namibia 0.50569 0.0000% 0 0.115454146 2003 
Jamaica 1.097001 0.0000% 0 0.127930353 2003 
Namibia 0.395685 0.0000% 0 0.140252075 2004 
Jordan 1.296735 0.0000% 0 0.185393878 2004 
Croatia 1.468503 0.0000% 1 0.378264502 2003 
Croatia 2.106132 0.0000% 0 0.541711641 2004 
Croatia 1.62548 0.0000% 0 0.566424082 2005 
Kosovo 7.620329 0.0000% 0 N/A 2004 
Kosovo 7.8408 0.0000% 0 N/A 2005 
Montenegro 28.94235 0.0000% N/A N/A 2004 
Montenegro 2.213772 0.0000% N/A N/A 2005 
 
 
Y= USAID funding for democracy-related programmes per capita 
Z1=Security Effectiveness 
Z2=Government Effectiveness 
D1=Near East States (Dummy variable) 
D2=Post-Soviet States (Dummy variables) 
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APPENDIX C: SUMMARY OUTPUT OF REGRESSION ANALYSIS  
 
 
Regression Statistics 
       Multiple R 0,551895 
       R Square 0,304588 
       Adjusted R 
Square 0,259235 
       Standard 
Error 0,518347 
       Observations 99 
       
 
ANOVA 
        
  df SS MS F 
Significance 
F 
   Regression 6 10,8268 1,804466 6,715953 6,38E-06 
   Residual 92 24,71889 0,268684 
     Total 98 35,54568     
   
 
  Coefficients 
Standard 
Error t Stat P-value 
Intercept 0,71426 0,101385 7,045054 3,3E-10 
X -3,85701 1,877255 -2,0546 0,042754 
Z1 -0,12747 0,050223 -2,5381 0,012827 
Z2 0,164727 0,111524 1,477051 0,143077 
D1 -0,41439 0,190914 -2,17056 0,032539 
D2 0,537625 0,170653 3,150402 0,0022 
D2X -28,2589 13,60734 -2,07674 0,040614 
 
 
 
 
 
